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INTRODUCTION
Anyone who has been involved with death penalty litigation in 
the past four decades knows that one of the most scandalous as-
pects of that process—in many ways, the most scandalous—is the 
inadequacy of counsel so often provided to defendants facing exe-
cution. By now, virtually anyone with even a passing interest is well 
versed in the cases and stories about sleeping lawyers, missed dead-
lines, alcoholic and disoriented lawyers, and, more globally, lawyers 
who simply failed to vigorously defend their clients.1 This is not 
news.
And, in the same vein, anyone who has been so involved with 
this area of law and policy for the past thirty-five years knows that it 
is impossible to make sense of any of these developments without a 
deep understanding of the Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland 
v. Washington,2 the case that established a pallid, virtually-
impossible-to-fail test for adequacy of counsel in such litigation.3
Again, this is not news.
1. See, e.g., Kenneth Williams, Does Strickland Prejudice Defendants on Death Row?, 43 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1459, 1460 (2009); id. at 1459 n.3 (comparing Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 
338 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding that defendant had ineffective assistance of counsel because his 
lawyer slept through significant portions of his capital murder trial) with Ex parte McFarland,
163 S.W.3d 743, 748–49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (finding no ineffective assistance even 
though lead counsel slept through nearly entire trial)); see generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN,
MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY: THE SHAME OF THE STATES 131–34 (2013) (dis-
cussing cases).
2. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
3. One of the authors (MLP) has been writing about this for twenty-five years. See Mi-
chael L. Perlin, The Sanist Lives of Jurors in Death Penalty Cases: The Puzzling Role of Mitigating 
Mental Disability Evidence, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y. 239 (1994) [hereinafter 
Perlin, Sanist Lives]; Michael L. Perlin, “The Executioner’s Face Is Always Well-Hidden”: The Role 
of Counsel and the Courts in Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 201, 205–06 (1996) 
[hereinafter Perlin, Executioner’s Face] (footnotes omitted) (“Since 1983, when the Supreme 
Court established a pallid, nearly-impossible-to-violate, adequacy standard in Strickland v. 
Washington (requiring simply that counsel’s efforts be “reasonable” under the circumstanc-
es), courts have become less and less interested in the question at hand, and little evidence 
disputes the failure of Strickland to insure that capital defendants truly receive adequate as-
sistance of counsel.”).
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We also know that some of the most troubling results in Strick-
land interpretations have come in cases in which the defendant was 
mentally disabled—either by serious mental illness or by intellec-
tual disability.4 Some of the decisions in these cases—rejecting 
Strickland-based appeals—have been shocking, and “make a mock-
ery out of the notion of a constitutionally based standard.”5 By way 
of example, the undisputed evidence is that, with regards to mat-
ters of mitigation,6 “missed mental health claims” made up about 
one-third of an earlier cohort of cases studied.7
But, to the best of our knowledge, no one has—prior to this Ar-
ticle—undertaken an extensive empirical analysis of how one dis-
crete U.S. federal circuit court of appeals has dealt with a wide ar-
ray of Strickland-claim cases in cases involving defendants with 
mental disabilities.8 We do this here. In this Article, we reexamine 
these issues from the perspective of the 198 cases decided in the
Fifth Circuit from 1984 to 2017 involving death penalty verdicts in 
state prosecutions in which, at some stage of the appellate process, 
a Strickland claim was made.9 As we demonstrate subsequently, 
Strickland is indeed a pallid standard, fostering “tolerance of abys-
mal lawyering,”10 and is one that makes a mockery of the most vital 
of constitutional law protections: the right to adequate counsel.11
This Article will proceed in this way. First, we discuss the back-
ground of the development of counsel adequacy in death penalty 
cases. Next, we look carefully at Strickland, and the subsequent Su-
preme Court cases that appear—on the surface—to bolster it in 
this context. We then consider multiple jurisprudential filters that 
4. Interestingly, this latter cohort includes cases that have been of great interest to the 
Supreme Court in the past seventeen years. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), 
Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014), and Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017), all dis-
cussed in MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL (3d ed. 2018), §§ 17-4-2.2 to 17-4-2.4, at 17–85 to 17–119 (discussing cases), and 
Moore v. Texas, 139 S. Ct. 666 (2019), discussed in id. § 17-4.2.5, at 17–127 to 17–128 (3d 
ed. 2019).
5. PERLIN, supra note 1, at 132.
6. See infra part III.B.
7. See Leona D. Jochnowitz, Missed or Foregone Mitigation: Analyzing Claimed Error in Mis-
souri Capital Clemency Cases, 46 CRIM. L. BULL., 347, 375 (2010).
8. For a listing of all Strickland cases prior to 1988, see Martin Calhoun, How to Thread
the Needle: Toward a Checklist-Based Standard for Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims,
77 GEO. L.J. 413, 458, Appendix I (1988) (finding that ineffective assistance was found in 
fewer than 5% of that cohort of cases).
9. See infra part III. A., explaining the research methodology.
10. William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland’s Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Undermin-
ing of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91, 94 (1995).
11. We use the word “mockery” consciously. Prior to Strickland, the test for adequacy of 
counsel in many circuits was whether the trial was a “farce and a mockery of justice.” Diggs v. 
Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1945). Under that test, convictions would be overturned 
only if counsel’s performance was “so ineffective as to shock the conscience of the court.” 
United States v. Steed, 465 F.2d 1310, 1317 (9th Cir. 1972).
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we believe must be taken seriously if this area of the law is to be 
given any authentic meaning. Next, we will examine and interpret 
the data that we have developed. Finally, we will look at this entire 
area of law through the filter of therapeutic jurisprudence, and 
then explain why and how the charade of “adequacy of counsel 
law” fails miserably to meet the standards of this important school 
of thought.
Our title comes, in part, from Bob Dylan’s song, Shelter from the 
Storm.12 As one of the authors (MLP) has previously noted in an-
other article drawing on that song’s lyrics, “[i]n a full-length book 
about that album, the critics Andy Gill and Kevin Odegard charac-
terize the song as depicting a ‘mythic image of torment.’”13 The de-
fendants in the cases we write about—by and large, defendants 
with profound mental disabilities who face the death penalty in 
large part because of the inadequacy of their legal representa-
tion—confront (and are defeated by) a world of ‘steel-eyed death.’
We hope that this Article helps change these realities.
I. ADEQUACY OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES14
A. The Reality of Inadequacy
If one looks at a range of death penalty cases that have been liti-
gated in the forty-plus years since the United States Supreme 
Court’s holding in Gregg v. Georgia15 that the death penalty was not 
necessarily a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel 
and unusual punishment, one undeniable truth emerges: in so 
many of these cases, the most critical issue in determining whether 
a defendant lives or dies is the quality of counsel.16 Stephen Bright, 
one of the great death penalty lawyers, has said flatly that “the 
death penalty will too often be punishment not for committing the 
12. BOB DYLAN, SHELTER FROM THE STORM (Columbia Records 1975).
13. Michael L. Perlin & Henry A. Dlugacz, ‘‘It’s Doom Alone That Counts’’: Can Interna-
tional Human Rights Law Be an Effective Source of Rights in Correctional Conditions Litigation? 27 
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 675, 677 (2009) (quoting ANDY GILL & KEVIN ODEGARD, A SIMPLE TWIST OF 
FATE: BOB DYLAN AND THE MAKING OF BLOOD ON THE TRACKS 163 (2004)); see also Michael 
L. Perlin, ‘I’ll Give You Shelter from the Storm’: Privilege, Confidentiality, and Confessions of Crime,
29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1699 (1996).
14. See generally PERLIN, supra note 1, at 123–38, from which portions of this section are 
adapted.
15. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
16. See State v. Morton, 715 A.2d 228, 277 (N.J. 1998) (Handler, J., dissenting in part) 
(quoting Perlin, Executioner’s Face, supra note 3, at 202).
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worst crime, but for being assigned the worst lawyer.”17 By way of 
example, a recent comprehensive study of the operation of the 
death penalty in Tennessee found a reversal rate of 23% based on 
inadequate representation, truly a jaw-dropping figure.18
In death penalty cases, attorneys—who are frequently criminally 
underfunded19—must search for a way to develop an authentic re-
lationship with and “humanize” their client,20 typically one who is 
the target of public and media animosity.21 They must investigate 
for mitigating evidence, obtain expert defense witnesses, investi-
gate to rebut aggravating evidence, and attempt to negotiate a plea 
bargain where appropriate.22 If there is a guilty verdict, they must 
be prepared to make informed strategic decisions about the penal-
ty phase.23 No one has seriously contradicted Professor Welsh 
White’s statement that “[t]he single greatest problem with our sys-
tem of capital punishment is the quality of representation afforded 
capital defendants,”24 nor has anyone seriously questioned the ac-
curacy of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s observation: “I have yet to 
see a death case among the dozens coming to the Supreme Court 
on eve-of-execution stay applications in which the defendant was 
well represented at trial.”25
The inadequacy of trial and appellate lawyers for capital defend-
ants has been widely recognized as the “single most spectacular 
failure in the administration of capital punishment.”26 There are 
17. Stephen Bright, Death by Lottery—Procedural Bar of Constitutional Claims in Capital Cas-
es Due to Inadequate Representation of Indigent Defendants, 92 W. VA. L. REV. 679, 695 (1990); see 
also Williams, supra note 1, at 1459 (“Whether one ends up on death row is usually deter-
mined not by the heinousness of the crime, but by the quality of trial counsel.”).
18. Bradley A. MacLean & H.E. Miller, Jr., Tennessee’s Death Penalty Lottery, 13 TENN. J. L.
& POL’Y 85, 146 (2018).
19. Pun intended. See, e.g., Wiles v. Bagley, 561 F.3d 636, 645 n. 15 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(quoting ABA MORATORIUM IMPLEMENTATION PROJECT, STATE DEATH PENALTY 
ASSESSMENTS: KEY FINDINGS (2007) (“The compensation paid to appointed capital defense 
attorneys is often woefully inadequate, dipping to well under $50 per hour in some cases.”)).
20. Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases: The Evolving Standard of 
Care, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 323, 338, 361 (1993).
21. See id. at 340–41.
22. Id. at 342–43.
23. See generally James M. Doyle, The Lawyers’ Art: “Representation” in Capital Cases, 8 YALE 
J.L. & HUMAN. 417 (1996) (discussing the importance of shaping a client’s image).
24. White, supra note 20, at 376 (emphasis added).
25. Justice Backs Death Penalty Freeze, CBS NEWS (April 10, 2001),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/justice-backs-death-penalty-freeze/.
26. Note, The Eighth Amendment and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Trials, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 1923, 1923 (1994); see also, e.g., Ira Robbins, Toward a More Just and Effective 
System of Review in State Death Penalty Cases, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 16 (1990) (“Specifically, the 
lack and inadequacy of counsel in state capital proceedings forces state and federal post-
conviction judges to: adjudicate cases on the basis of incomplete and often incomprehensi-
ble records; resolve manifold colorable claims of ineffective assistance of counsel; dispose of 
myriad procedural questions—including exhaustion of state remedies, procedural default, 
and successive petition issues—arising from the failure of counsel to notice and assert meri-
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many reasons for this, including, importantly, funding systems that 
discourage experienced and competent criminal attorneys from 
taking appointments in death penalty cases and prevent even the 
most talented attorneys from preparing an adequate defense, par-
ticularly for the penalty phase.27
Capital defendants are often represented by “the bottom of the 
bar.”28 An American Bar Association (ABA) Report on the repre-
sentation of Georgia defendants facing the death penalty thus con-
cluded:
[The state’s] recent experience with capital punishment 
has been marred by examples of inadequate representation 
ranging from virtually no representation at all by counsel, 
to representation by inexperienced counsel, to failures to 
investigate basic threshold questions, to lack of knowledge 
of governing law, to lack of advocacy on the issue of guilt, 
to failure to present a case for life at the penalty phase.29
The situation is worse—far worse—for defendants with mental 
disabilities. Forty years ago, when surveying the availability of coun-
sel to mentally disabled litigants, President Carter’s Commission 
on Mental Health noted the frequently substandard level of repre-
sentation made available to mentally disabled criminal defend-
ants.30 Little that has happened in the intervening decades has 
been a palliative for this problem. As Mental Health America 
torious claims for relief; and grant constitutionally mandated relief and costly retrials in 
numerous cases.”).
27. See Commonwealth v. McGarrell, 87 A. 3d 809, 811 (Pa. 2014) (McCaffery, J., dis-
senting) (writing separately “to explain why, in my view, the continued oversight of this 
Court is necessary with respect to the reform measures undertaken to remedy Philadelphia’s 
heretofore chronic underfunding for legal services for indigent capital defendants . . . .”); 
Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sen-
tences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 397–98 (1995).
28. Stephanie Saul, When Death Is the Penalty: Attorneys for Poor Defendants Often Lack Expe-
rience and Skill, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Nov. 25, 1991, at 8. As of the late 1980’s/early 1990’s, ten per-
cent of death row prisoners in Alabama were represented by trial lawyers subsequently dis-
barred or disciplined. Marcia Coyle et al., Fatal Defense: Trial and Error in the Nation’s Death 
Belt, NAT’L L.J., June 11, 1990, at 30. Almost thirteen percent of such inmates in Louisiana 
were represented by similar counsel. Id. Almost twenty-five percent of Kentucky’s death row 
inmates were represented by lawyers since disbarred or suspended. Saul, supra at 8. An ap-
pointed counsel in a death case told the press, “I despise [being appointed], I’d rather take 
a whipping . . . .” Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487, 1522 (11th Cir. 1985). One rationale for 
this phenomenon is that judges subject to reelection who must appear tough on crime may 
purposely appoint defense counsel of low quality. Panel Discussion, The Death of Fairness? 
Counsel Competency and Due Process in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 1105, 1198 (1994).
29. Robbins, supra note 26, at 66 (citations omitted).
30. Cf. Mental Health and Human Rights: Report of the Task Panel on Legal and Ethical Issues,
20 ARIZ. L. REV. 49, 62 (1978) (noting that few public defender offices or other legal services 
organizations provide special expertise in this area).
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(formerly, the National Mental Health Association) has observed, 
“[t]he process of determining guilt and imposing sentence is nec-
essarily more complex for individuals with mental health condi-
tions. A high standard of care is essential with regard to legal rep-
resentation as well as psychological and psychiatric evaluation for 
individuals with mental health conditions involved in death penalty 
cases.”31
There is no question that, in a death penalty case, representing a 
defendant with a mental disability is ‘harder’ than representing 
other defendants. Consider the Commentary to the ABA Guidelines for 
the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty 
Cases, focusing on the special problems related to the issue of trust32
in the representation of the defendant with a mental disability or 
from a different cultural background33 than the lawyer:
Many capital defendants are . . . severely impaired in ways 
that make effective communication difficult: they may have 
mental illnesses or personality disorders that make them 
highly distrustful or impair their reasoning and perception 
of reality; they may be mentally retarded or have other 
cognitive impairments that affect their judgment and un-
derstanding; they may be depressed and even suicidal; or 
they may be in complete denial in the face of overwhelm-
ing evidence. In fact, the prevalence of mental illness and 
impaired reasoning is so high in the capital defendant 
population that “[i]t must be assumed that the client is 
emotionally and intellectually impaired.” There will also of-
ten be significant cultural and/or language barriers be-
tween the client and his lawyers. In many cases, a mitigation 
specialist, social worker or other mental health expert can 
31. Position Statement 54: Death Penalty and People with Mental Illnesses, MENTAL HEALTH 
AMERICA, https://www.mhanational.org/issues/position-statement-54-death-penalty-and-
people-mental-illnesses (last visited Dec. 1, 2019); see also, e.g., Amy Greenbaum, The Death 
Penalty: Mentally Ill Men Are Executed; Mentally Ill Women Are Committed, 42 T. MARSHALL L.
REV. ONLINE 1, 10 (2016) (“Key players in the criminal justice system have deluded them-
selves in believing that they know mental illness when they see it, a misconception that car-
ries lethal consequences for the mentally ill capital defendant.”).
32. See, e.g., Easton v. Wilson, 2014 WL 6622512, at 22 (D. Wyo. 2014) (“Counsel at all 
stages of the case should make every appropriate effort to establish a relationship of trust 
with the client.”) (quoting ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF 
DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 10.5(A) (Feb. 2003)).
33. See Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty 
Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677, 682–83 (2008) (emphasizing the importance of the mitiga-
tion specialist’s role in assisting defense counsel to overcome the obstacles to communi-
cating with the client presented by the client’s mental health problems or social and cultural 
backgrounds).
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help identify and overcome these barriers, and assist coun-
sel in establishing a rapport with the client.34
Evidence reveals the enormity of this problem. A review of 
eighty death sentences issued in four “death belt states” (Georgia, 
Mississippi, Alabama and Virginia) between 1997 and 2004 found 
that “[i]n 73 of the 80 cases, defense lawyers gave jurors little or no 
evidence to help them decide whether the accused should live or 
die. The lawyers routinely missed myriad issues of abuse and men-
tal deficiency, abject poverty and serious psychological problems.”35
John Blume and Pamela Blume Leonard have made the signifi-
cance of these errors—and their potentially fatal outcome—crystal-
clear:
To address mental health issues competently and effective-
ly, defense counsel must understand the wide range of 
mental health issues relevant to criminal cases, recognize 
and identify the multitude of symptoms that may be exhib-
ited by our clients, and be familiar with how mental health 
experts arrive at diagnoses and determine how the client’s
mental illness influenced his behavior at the time of the of-
fense. Without this knowledge, it is impossible to advocate 
effectively for a mentally ill client or to overcome jurors’
cynicism about mental health issues. We believe juror skep-
ticism often reflects inadequate development and ineffec-
tive presentation rather than a biased refusal to appreciate 
the tragic consequences of mental illness.36
B. The Impact of Strickland
Since 1983, when the Supreme Court decided Strickland (requir-
ing simply that counsel’s efforts be “reasonable” under the circum-
stances),37 courts have become less and less interested in the ques-
tion at hand, and little evidence disputes the failure of Strickland to 
ensure that capital defendants truly receive adequate assistance of 
counsel.38
34. American Bar Association, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense 
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 1007–08 (2003) (citations omitted).
35. Sanjay K. Chhablani, Chronically Stricken: A Continuing Legacy of Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel, 28 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 351, 363 (2009) (citations omitted).
36. John Blume & Pamela Blume Leonard, Capital Cases, CHAMPION, November 2000, 
at 63.
37. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669 (1984).
38. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 4, §17-3.6, at 17-32 to 17-44.
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The test for an ineffectiveness claim in Strickland is “whether 
counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper function of the ad-
versarial process that the trial court cannot be relied on as having 
produced a just result.”39 To determine whether counsel’s assis-
tance was “so defective as to require reversal,”40 the Court estab-
lished a two-part test:
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance 
was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made er-
rors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 
“counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amend-
ment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense. This requires show-
ing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Un-
less a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said 
that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a 
breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result 
unreliable.41
The Court concluded that the new “objective,” “reasonably ef-
fective assistance” standard need be measured by “simply reasona-
bleness under prevailing professional norms.”42 Here, the Court 
would “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”43
In the case before it, the Court found that there was a duty for 
counsel to “make reasonable investigations or to make a reasona-
ble decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.”44
But, even a “professionally unreasonable”45 error will not result in 
reversal if such error “had no effect on the judgment.”46 To prevail, 
a defendant must show prejudice, as measured by a showing of “a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional er-
rors, the result . . . would have been different.”47
39. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
40. Id. at 687.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 687–88.
43. Id. at 689.
44. Id. at 691.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 694. Applying these principles to the case before the Court was “not difficult.” 
Id. at 698. It found that respondent’s trial counsel’s conduct “cannot be found unreasona-
ble,” and that, even assuming unreasonableness, “respondent suffered insufficient prejudice 
to warrant setting aside his death sentence.” Id. at 698–99. The Court characterized trial 
counsel as having made a “strategic choice,” with nothing in the record showing that his 
“sense of hopelessness distorted his professional judgment, and the decision not to seek 
270 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 53:2
Justice Marshall sharply dissented,48 critiquing the majority’s
adoption of a performance standard “that is so malleable that, in 
practice, it will either have no grip at all or will yield excessive vari-
ation in the manner in which the Sixth Amendment is interpret-
ed.”49 By this vagueness, he concluded, the Court has “not only ab-
dicated its own responsibility to interpret the Constitution, but also 
impaired the ability of the lower courts to exercise theirs.”50
Individual post-Strickland cases are striking and, by any metric, 
bizarre.51 In one case, counsel was found to be effective even 
though he had failed to introduce ballistics evidence showing that 
the gun taken from the defendant was not the murder weapon.52
In another, an attorney was found constitutionally adequate to 
provide representation to a death-eligible defendant notwithstand-
ing the fact that he had been admitted to the bar for only six 
months and had never tried a jury case.53 Another lawyer was found 
constitutionally adequate even where during the middle of the trial 
he appeared in court intoxicated and spent a night in jail.54 There 
is little evidence to contradict Welsh White’s conclusion that 
“[l]ower courts’ application of Strickland has produced some appal-
ling results.”55
more character or psychological evidence than was already in hand was likewise reasonable.” 
Id. at 699. In short, “[f]ailure to make the required showing of either deficient performance 
or sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness of the claim.” Id. at 700. Generally, beyond 
the scope of this Article, is the question of how prejudice is to be accurately assessed in such 
cases. See infra note 135 on the question of prejudice in Strickland cases in the context of vio-
lations of Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985)  (“More generally,” the Court concluded, “re-
spondent has made no showing that the justice of his sentence was rendered unreliable by a 
breakdown in the adversary process caused by deficiencies in counsel’s assistance,” thus, 
“the sentencing proceeding was not fundamentally unfair.”); see also MICHAEL L. PERLIN,
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 148–54 (1995).
48. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 706.
49. Id. at 707
50. Id. at 708. Justice Marshall characterized the standard as suffering from a “debilitat-
ing ambiguity,” which will likely “stunt the development of Constitutional doctrine in this 
area.” Id. at 708–09. Justice Brennan filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and dis-
senting in part. Id. at 701.
51. This array of cases does not focus on the mental health issues that are at the heart 
of this paper.
52. Graham v. Collins, 829 F. Supp. 204, 209 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
53. Paradis v. Arave, 954 F.2d 1483, 1490–92 (9th Cir. 1992).
54. Haney v. State, 603 So. 2d 368, 377–78 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991). Of course, pre-
Strickland cases were also appalling. In one, defense counsel was not even aware that sepa-
rate sentencing proceedings were to be held in death penalty cases. See Young v. Zant, 677 
F.2d 792, 797 (11th Cir. 1982).
55. Welsh S. White, Capital Punishment’s Future, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1429, 1436 (1993) (re-
viewing RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1991)). For other ex-
amples see Stephen Bright, The Death Penalty as the Answer to Crime: Costly, Counterproductive, 
and Corrupting, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1068, 1078–84 (1996) and Christine Wisermen, Rep-
resenting the Condemned: A Critique of Capital Punishment, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 731, 742–44 (1996). 
See also Meredith J. Duncan, The (So-Called) Liability of Criminal Defense Attorneys: A System in 
Need of Reform, 2002 B.Y.U.L. REV. 1, 18–20 (2002) (noting that “[t]he unfortunate aftermath 
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It became clear to all who were listening that Strickland was, op-
erationally, a disaster. The chairperson of the Competency Com-
mittee of the ABA Section on Criminal Justice called it “unfortu-
nate and misguided,” charging it “failed to meet its obligation to 
help ensure that criminal defendants receive competent represen-
tation,”56 concluding that it was drafted “to ensure that the review 
test will produce the same results as the old ‘farce and mockery-
due process’ test.”57 Self-evidently, the test’s application to the facts 
of the case before the court in Strickland “underscores this return 
to the status quo ante.”58 As the late William Genego despairingly 
concluded, Strickland was “a clear signal that [the Supreme Court] 
is not at all disturbed with inadequate performance by criminal de-
fense lawyers,”59 and supported the conclusion that “the problem 
of Strickland is that a criminally accused’s right to the effective assistance of counsel does not 
have much substance to it at all” and that “even though the Court professed to fashion a test 
that would lead to the just review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, it is doubtful 
whether ineffective assistance of counsel claims are currently justly reviewed.”). The Su-
preme Court also construed Strickland narrowly in other contexts. See, e.g., Smith v. Spisak, 
558 U.S. 139 (2010) (defendant not prejudiced by inadequate closing argument at penalty 
phase).
56. William J. Genego, The Future of Effective Assistance of Counsel: Performance Standards 
and Competent Representation, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 181, 182 (1984).
57. Id. at 196. For a comprehensive set of specific performance standards embodying 
an “efficient and functional assistance test,” see Barbara J. Buba, Comment, The Standard for 
Effective Assistance of Counsel in Pennsylvania—An Ineffective Method of Ensuring Competent Defense 
Representation, 89 DICKINSON L. REV. 41, 69–71 (1985). For excellent early reviews of all rele-
vant issues, see Jeffrey Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to Ef-
fective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REV. 425 (1996); 
Richard Klein, The Relationship of the Court and Defense Counsel: The Impact of Competent Repre-
sentation and Proposals for Reform, 29 B.C. L. REV. 531 (1988); Melody Martin, Defending the 
Mentally III Client in Criminal Matters: Ethics, Advocacy, and Responsibility, 52 U. TORONTO FAC.
L. REV. 73 (1993); Geimer, supra note 10. For later considerations of Strickland, see, e.g., Eve 
Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679 (2007); Robert R. Rigg, The T-Rex Without Teeth: Evolving 
Strickland v. Washington and the Test for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 77 
(2007). The “farce and mockery” test was this: “A lack of effective assistance of counsel must 
be of such a kind as to shock the conscience of the Court and make the proceedings a farce 
and mockery of justice.” United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 950 (1950).
58. PERLIN, supra note 47, at 16 (citing Genego, supra note 56, at 196–98, 209–11); see 
also Susan K. VanBuren, Note, The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Quandary: The Debate Contin-
ues, 18 AKRON L. REV. 325, 334 (1984) (Strickland’s seemingly “objective” test is “poisoned 
with obtrusive subjectivity.”); Jonathan E. Fink, Note, Constitutional Law—Sixth Amendment 
Guarantees Assistance of Counsel That Is Reasonably Effective and Does Not Prejudice the Fairness of 
the Proceeding, 14 U. BALT. L. REV. 335, 344, 345 (1985) (Strickland Court’s analysis of ineffec-
tive counsel claims “self-defeating”; case’s result “very well may be the expeditious disposal, if 
not the outright discouragement, of ineffective assistance allegations, rather than the pro-
tection of the fundamental fairness of the proceedings in such claims.”). But cf. State v. 
Nash, 694 P.2d 222, 228 (Ariz. 1985) (adopting Strickland because its “objective standard 
provides better guidance to lawyers and judges” than would a “more subjective” test).
59. Genego, supra note 56, at 202.
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of competency, at least in criminal cases, should be taken off the 
agenda.”60
C. In the Aftermath of Strickland
An examination of an array of reported post-Strickland decisions 
involving findings of deficiency in death penalty cases in which de-
fendants’ history of serious mental disability was ignored by coun-
sel clearly calls into question one of the core assumptions of the 
Strickland case: that counsel does exercise substantial professional 
judgment in providing representation.61 This is especially critical in 
cases where counsel completely “misses” what might be seen as mit-
igating evidence.62 Consider the level of lawyer-incompetence in 
those cases in which counsel was found to be deficient:63
• where counsel failed to discover reports from a psy-
chologist that found defendant might have been in-
competent to stand trial due to possible brain damage 
and head injuries;64
• where counsel failed to investigate defendant’s social 
or mental health background, and failed to find re-
ports determining defendant to be mentally retarded, 
and disclosing defendant’s diagnosis of paranoid 
schizophrenia;65
• where counsel failed to give an expert witness docu-
mentation about defendant’s mental illness and evi-
dence of defendant’s conduct at the time of the 
crime;66 or
60. Id.; see also Peter Tague, The Attempt to Improve Criminal Defense Representation, 15 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 109, 165 (1977) (concluding, pre-Strickland, that “[u]nless courts are willing to 
police the attorney, they should candidly admit that the call for ‘effective representation’ is 
simply rhetoric.”).
61. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Ineffective Assistance at Sentencing, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1069, 
1076 (2009) (Strickland is “a shield for counsel’s behavior against judicial scrutiny.”).
62. See Leona D. Jochnowitz, Missed Mitigation: Counsel’s Evolving Duty to Assess and Pre-
sent Mitigation at Death Penalty Sentencing, 43 CRIM. L. BULL. 3 (2007); Jochnowitz, supra note 
7.
63. These cases are discussed in PERLIN, supra note 1, at 131–32.
64. Douglas v. Woodford, 316 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Sara R. Faber, Compe-
tency, Counsel, and Criminal Defendants’ Inability to Participate, 67 DUKE L.J. 1219 (2018); Sarah 
Gerwig-Moore, On Competence: (Re)considering Appropriate Legal Standards for Examining Sixth 
Amendment Claims Related to Criminal Defendants’ Mental Illness and Disability, 84 TENN. L. REV.
971, 979–80 (2017) (on Strickland in incompetency cases); PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 4, § 
13-1.5.4.
65. Summerlin v. Schriro, 427 F.3d 623 (9th Cir. 2005).
66. Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2006).
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• where counsel failed to read the record of defendant’s
prior trials and thus failed to learn that defendant po-
tentially suffered from brain damage (and then when 
made aware, failed to consult a neurologist), and 
failed to sufficiently investigate defendant’s back-
ground so as to learn of his very low IQ scores.67
But, as we explore in depth in Part III, these examples in no way 
should be taken as evidence that Strickland is an effective palliative 
for the problems at hand. Interpretative cases in both federal and 
state courts have been wildly inconsistent.68 The vast majority of 
appellate cases—both the ones we study in this paper and those 
discussed elsewhere69—have affirmed convictions or the denial of 
habeas writs, concluding that counsel’s performance was adequate 
under the Strickland v. Washington standard.70 Consideration of spe-
cific subsets of cases that are structurally related to those that are at 
the heart of this paper—those construing Panetti v. Quarterman71
and a defendant’s right to neurological testing72—reveals a series 
of Strickland-based decisions that make a mockery out of the notion 
of a constitutionally-based standard.73 Witnesses before an ABA 
Task Force characterized counsel’s performance in death penalty 
cases in general variously as “‘scandalous,’ ‘shameful,’ ‘abysmal,’
‘pathetic,’ [and] ‘deplorable.’”74 In the words of one commentator, 
Strickland serves merely as a “gatepost[ ] on the road to legal con-
demnation.”75
This all flies in the face of what the American Bar Association 
has tried, vainly, to do. ABA Supplemental Guideline 5.1 discusses 
those skill sets required in the provision of adequate counsel: cul-
tural competency, knowledge of mental health signs and symp-
toms, and skills required in interviewing and record gathering.76
67. Frierson v. Woodford, 463 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2006).
68. For a nearly-nihilistic view, see Amy R. Murphy, The Constitutional Failure of the Strick-
land Standard in Capital Cases Under the Eighth Amendment, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179, 
205 (2000) (“A comparison of the cases that cleared the Strickland hurdle and those that did 
not suggests that all that really matters in [ineffective assistance of counsel] claims is the ap-
pellate court’s view of the case.”).
69. See, e.g., Calhoun, supra note 8.
70. The Strickland standard was eroded even further in Spriggs v. Collins, 993 F.2d 85, 
88 (5th Cir. 1993) (no violation of Strickland in non-capital sentencing case unless defendant 
can demonstrate that the sentence would have been “significantly” less severe). For other 
examples of courts rejecting Strickland claims, see, e.g., PERLIN, supra note 1, at 256–57 n. 98 
(listing cases).
71. 551 U.S. 930 (2007) (competency to be executed).
72. See PERLIN, supra note 1, at 93–108.
73. For an array of such cases, see id. at 133.
74. Robbins, supra note 26, at 69 (citation omitted).
75. Bright, Death by Lottery, supra note 5, at 683.
76. See Russell Stetler, The Mystery of Mitigation: What Jurors Need to Make a Reasoned Moral 
Response in Capital Sentencing, 11 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 237, 263 (2007–08).
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But the Supreme Court’s clear disinclination—and lower federal 
courts’ even clearer disinclination—to carefully assess counsel’s
performance in providing criminal defense services is reflected 
squarely in its failure to insist that defense counsel must comply 
with this Guideline.77 On balance, Strickland is a nonstandard—a
disastrous nonstandard—that provides virtually no safeguards for 
criminal defendants with mental disabilities. For those facing the 
death penalty, it is little more than an empty shell.78
D. Supreme Court Developments After Strickland
In the years following the Strickland decision, the Supreme Court 
demonstrated overwhelming ambivalence about counsel adequacy 
issues. In Alvord v. Wainwright,79 the Court denied certiorari in a case 
where defense counsel accepted his client’s refusal to rely on the 
insanity defense with no independent investigation of his client’s
mental or criminal history, despite the fact that the record demon-
strated unequivocally that the defendant had a history of mental 
illness and had been acquitted on insanity grounds six years prior 
to his indictment in the current case.80 Justice Marshall concluded 
in his dissent from the certiorari denial:
The lower court has countenanced a view of counsel’s con-
stitutional duty that is blind to the ability of the individual 
defendant to understand his situation and usefully to assist 
in his defense. The result is to deny to the persons who are 
most in need of it the educated counsel of an attorney.81
77. Michael L. Perlin & Valerie R. McClain, “Where Souls Are Forgotten”: Cultural Compe-
tencies, Forensic Evaluations and International Human Rights, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 257,
260 (2009).
78. Ironically, in cases in which counsel actually does perform effectively (far beyond the 
minimal standards of Strickland), they may be criticized by judges in the Fifth Circuit for hav-
ing “torn” “the veil of civility” by their vigorous representation. See Bell v. Lynaugh, 858 F.2d 
978, 985–86 (5th Cir.1988) (Jones, J., specially concurring), cert. denied¸492 U.S. 925 (1989). 
Bell’s death sentence was ultimately vacated on the basis of his intellectual disability. See Bell 
v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330, 331 (5th Cir. 2002); Email from Edward Chikofsky, Bell’s appellate 
counsel, to the authors (March 14, 2019) (on file with authors). Bell is discussed infra note 
137.
79. 469 U.S. 956 (1984).
80. See id.; cf. People v. Frierson, 705 P.2d 396 (Cal. 1985) (holding that defense coun-
sel could not refuse to honor defendant’s clearly expressed desire to present diminished 
capacity defense at guilt/special circumstances phase of death penalty case; question was not 
merely a tactical decision). On the application of Strickland in insanity defense cases in gen-
eral, see, e.g., Gerwig-Moore supra note 64; PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 4, § 14–1.6, at 14–
117 to 14–127.
81. Alvord, 469 U.S. at 963.
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More recently, when the Court returned to this question again, 
it did demonstrate, in some cases, greater sensitivity to the issues at 
hand.82 By way of example, in Williams v. Taylor, it found that a 
death penalty petitioner had been denied his constitutionally 
guaranteed right to effective assistance of counsel when his lawyers 
failed to develop, investigate, and present substantial mitigating ev-
idence during the sentencing phase of his capital trial,83 a position 
it adhered to in subsequent cases.84 It later backtracked in Schriro v. 
Landrigan,85 a case involving a defendant who had a history of “re-
curr[ing] placements in . . . a psychiatric ward.”86 There, the Court 
reversed a habeas grant, finding that defense counsel’s failure to 
present mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase did not 
deprive petitioner of effective assistance of counsel.87
The Supreme Court has returned to this issue multiple times 
since its decision in Strickland, though, as we note in Part III, these 
cases have had little impact on the Fifth Circuit’s jurisprudence in 
this area of the law. In 2000, it reversed a death penalty conviction, 
ruling that the defendant was denied his constitutionally-
guaranteed right to effective assistance of counsel when his lawyers 
failed to investigate and present substantial mitigating evidence 
during a capital case’s sentencing phase.88 But it returned with 
much greater focus after the American Bar Association promulgat-
ed revised “Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of 
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases” (Guidelines). These 
Guidelines sought to significantly elevate the standard of represen-
tation in death penalty cases, providing the partial basis for the 
2003 Supreme Court decision in Wiggins v. Smith89 which estab-
lished the requirement for a thorough and comprehensive mitiga-
tion review.
82. But see Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 303–04 (2010) (argument that state-court deci-
sion involved unreasonable application of Strickland because counsel failed to make reason-
able investigation of petitioner’s mental deficiencies before deciding not to pursue or pre-
sent such evidence was not “fairly included” in questions presented and thus would not be 
addressed by Court); Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) (finding that the state court 
could have reasonably concluded that petitioner failed to rebut presumption of competence 
mandated by Strickland, and could have reasonably concluded that petitioner was not preju-
diced by counsel’s allegedly deficient performance).
83. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
84. See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005) (holding that failure to adequately 
investigate is ineffective assistance of counsel); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (fol-
lowing Rompilla). But see Williams, supra note 1, at 1461 (survey of lower court decisions both 
before and after Wiggins indicates that capital defendants did not achieve any greater success 
in obtaining relief after Wiggins than they did before Wiggins).
85. 550 U.S. 465 (2007).
86. Id. at 483 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 478–81.
88. Williams, 529 U.S. 362.
89. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
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In Wiggins, the Court found that the defendant’s attorney failed 
to conduct a comprehensive social history of his client, thus violat-
ing his Sixth Amendment rights.90 Specifically, the Court set forth 
the requirement that mitigation investigations include efforts to 
discover “all reasonably available” mitigating evidence, as well as 
evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that may be introduced 
by the prosecutor.91 Wiggins specifically incorporated the Guidelines,
whose objective was to “set forth a national standard of practice for 
the defense of capital cases in order to ensure high quality legal 
representation for all persons facing the possible imposition or ex-
ecution of a death sentence by any jurisdiction.”92
Under the Guidelines, at least one member of the defense team 
needed to be “qualified by training and experience to screen indi-
viduals for the presence of mental or psychological disorders or 
impairments.”93 The Guidelines also recommended the inclusion of 
a mitigation expert, a mental health professional who possesses:
clinical and information-gathering skills and training that 
most lawyers simply do not have. They have the time and 
ability to elicit sensitive, embarrassing and often humiliat-
ing evidence . . . that the defendant may have never dis-
closed. They have the clinical skills to recognize such things 
as congenital, mental or neurological conditions, to under-
stand how these conditions may have affected the defend-
ant’s development and behavior, and to identify the most 
appropriate experts to examine the defendant or testify on 
his behalf.94
90. Id. at 525–38.
91. Id. at 524.
92. ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty 
Cases 1.1(A) (rev. ed. 2003), in 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 919 (2003) [hereinafter Guide-
lines].
93. Id. at 952. “Creating a competent and reliable mental health evaluation consistent 
with prevailing standards of practices is a time consuming and expensive process. Counsel 
must compile extensive historical data, as well as obtaining a thorough physical and neuro-
logical examination. Diagnostic studies, neuropsychological testing, appropriate brain scans, 
blood tests or genetic studies, and consultation with additional mental health specialists may 
also be necessary.” Id. at 956. In this context, see Alison J. Lynch, Veterans on Death Row: Strat-
egies for Mitigating Capital Sentences for Defendants with Military Service History, 32 CRIM. JUST. 4 
(2018).
94. Guidelines, supra note 92, at 959 (citations omitted). For a thoughtful inquiry into 
the role of the mitigation specialist, see Emily Hughes, Mitigating Death, 18 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 337 (2009). On the diverse set of skills needed to engage in fact investigation, see
Russell Stetler, Mitigation Investigation: A Duty That Demands Expert Help but Can’t Be Delegated,
31 THE CHAMPION 61 (2007). On the significance of the ABA Guidelines in general, see Rus-
sell Stetler & W. Bradley Wendel, The ABA Guidelines and the Norms of Capital Defense Represen-
tation, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 635 (2013).
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Several years later, the Supreme Court returned to this issue in 
Rompilla v. Beard,95 holding that counsel’s failure to examine 
Rompilla’s prior conviction file constituted deficient performance. 
It based this conclusion on its findings that counsel knew the pros-
ecution intended to use Rompilla’s prior conviction to prove an 
aggravating circumstance, and that the prior conviction file, which 
contained significant mitigation evidence, would likely have caused 
the jury to reach a different result had it been presented to them.96
Although a lengthy scholarly analysis soon after Rompilla was de-
cided concluded that “the Court has recognized the need to re-
work Strickland,”97 subsequent research—surveying lower court de-
cisions both before and after Wiggins—indicated that capital de-
fendants did not achieve any greater success in obtaining relief af-
ter Wiggins than they did before Wiggins.98 As Professor John Blume 
and a colleague ruefully noted, “[d]espite the Supreme Court’s
clear message, a number of courts still remain hostile to ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims and are still willing to put a judicial 
stamp of approval on appallingly inadequate representation.”99
The Court has continued to assess the underlying issues that 
have been presented in Strickland claims. Six years after Wiggins, it 
ruled that defense counsel’s failure to uncover and present during 
penalty phase any mitigating evidence regarding defendant’s men-
tal health, family background, or military service was deficient.100
95. 545 U.S. 374 (2005).
96. Id. at 390, 393. On the “shallow[ness]” of the investigation in Rompilla, see Sean 
O’Brien & Kathleen Wayland, Implicit Bias and Capital Decision-Making: Using Narrative to 
Counter Prejudicial Psychiatric Labels, 43 Hofstra L. Rev. 751, 775–77 (2015).
97. Whitney Cawley, Raising the Bar: How Rompilla v. Beard Represents the Court’s Increas-
ing Efforts to Impose Stricter Standards for Defense Lawyering in Capital Cases, 34 PEPP. L. REV.
1139, 1185 (2007).
98. Williams, supra note 1, at 1461. These findings sadly contradict the optimistic pre-
dictions of respected scholars and criminal law practitioners in the immediate aftermath of 
Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla. See, e.g., James S. Leibman & Lawrence C. Marshall, Less Is 
Better: Justice Stevens and the Narrowed Death Penalty, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1607, 1666 (2006) 
(Cases in question “reveal a willingness on the Court’s part to scrutinize death sentences 
more vigorously, particularly in cases falling near the mitigated circumference.”); Rigg, su-
pra note 57, at 88 (characterizing these cases as the “[t]urning [p]oint” in adequacy of 
counsel law).
99. John H. Blume & Stacey D. Neumann, “It’s Like Deja Vu All Over Again”: Williams v. 
Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla v. Beard and a (Partial) Return to the Guidelines Approach to 
the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 159–60 (2007).
100. Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 40 (2009). On how Porter nonetheless “fail[s] to 
acknowledge the reality of mental illness” in death penalty cases, see Michael L. Perlin, “I 
Expected It to Happen/I Knew He’d Lost Control”: The Impact of PTSD on Criminal Sentencing after 
the Promulgation of DSM-5, 2015 Utah L. Rev. 881, 926 (2015). Porter is also discussed in Phil-
lip H. Cherney, The Lamentable Mr. Toad: On the Wild Ride with Claims of Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel in Capital Cases Before the United States Supreme Court, 42 LINCOLN L. REV. 1, 26–28 
(2014–15).
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And in its most recent term,101 the Court returned to this issue 
once again, in Ayestas v. Davis,102 holding that the lower courts ap-
plied too stringent of a standard in rejecting defendant’s request 
for funding so that he could develop arguments that his trial coun-
sel’s failure to investigate petitioner’s mental health and alcohol 
and drug abuse rose to the level of ineffectiveness of counsel.103
But, as we noted previously, lower court cases have been wildly 
inconsistent, and many have simply ignored all the post-Strickland
decisions that seemed to have resuscitated at least a partially-sound 
adequacy of counsel standard. Although some reversed convictions 
or granted writs of habeas corpus based on findings of ineffective-
ness, the vast majority have affirmed convictions or the denial of 
habeas writs, concluding that counsel’s performance was adequate 
under the Strickland v. Washington standard.104 In sum, the vast ma-
jority of Strickland-based decisions “make a mockery out of the no-
tion of a constitutionally based standard.”105
II. SOME JURISPRUDENTIAL FILTERS
There is no longer any question—there cannot be any ques-
tion—as to how it is impossible to understand developments in this 
area of the law without a full consideration of the malignant and 
corrosive impact of sanism, pretextuality, heuristic reasoning and 
(false) “ordinary common sense.”106 “These factors have ‘poisoned 
and corrupted’ all of mental disability law,”107 have “malignantly 
101. After Porter but before Ayestas v. Davis, the Court had rejected defendant’s parallel 
arguments. See Smith v. Spisak, 558 U.S. 139 (2010) (assuming counsel performed deficient-
ly in making a penalty-phase closing argument that allegedly understated the facts upon 
which defense experts based their mental illness conclusions, defendant was not prejudiced, 
as an element of ineffective assistance of counsel).
102. 138 S. Ct. 1080 (2018).
103. The case turned on the interpretation of a federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3599(f),
which provides, in relevant part, that, in cases in which the death penalty may potentially be 
sought, a district court “may authorize” funding for “investigative, expert, or other ser-
vices . . . reasonably necessary for the representation of the defendant,” and the application 
of the procedural default doctrine. Ayestas was a Fifth Circuit case, and one of the first com-
mentaries about the case notes the rarity of a unanimous Supreme Court death penalty de-
cision in its “rebuk[e]” of the Fifth Circuit. See Laura Schaefer, The Ethical Argument for Fund-
ing in Clemency: The “Mercy” Function and the ABA Guidelines, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1257, 1274 
(2018).
104. Cases are discussed in PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 4, § 17-3.6.
105. Id., §6-3.3.3.
106. See Michael L. Perlin & Heather Ellis Cucolo, “Tolling for the Aching Ones Whose 
Wounds Cannot Be Nursed”: The Marginalization of Racial Minorities and Women in Institutional 
Mental Disability Law, 20 J. GENDER, RACE & JUSTICE 431, 451 (2017).
107. Michael L. Perlin & Meredith R. Schriver, “You Might Have Drugs at Your Command’’: 
Reconsidering the Forced Drugging of Incompetent Pre-trial Detainees from the Perspectives of Interna-
tional Human Rights and Income Inequality, 8 ALBANY GOV’T L. REV. 381, 394 (2015).
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distort[ed] both the legislative and judicial processes,”108 and have 
similarly “distort[ed] our abilities to rationally consider infor-
mation.”109 We believe it is impossible to understand developments 
in this area of the law without considering these factors, and their 
impact (both conscious and unconscious) on fact-finders.110
A. Sanism
Sanism dominates the entire representational process in cases 
involving individuals with mental disabilities,111 and it reflects what 
civil rights lawyer Florynce Kennedy has characterized as the “pa-
thology of oppression.”112 It is an irrational prejudice of the same 
quality and character of other irrational prejudices that cause (and 
are reflected in) racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry. 
Sanism is “largely invisible and largely socially acceptable.”113 It “in-
fects both our jurisprudence and our lawyering practices . . . [and 
is] based predominantly upon stereotype, myth, superstition, and 
deindividualization,”114 in “unconscious response to events both in 
everyday life and in the legal process.”115 Its “corrosive effects have 
warped all aspects of the criminal process.”116
108. Michael L. Perlin, “Simplify You, Classify You”: Stigma, Stereotypes and Civil Rights in 
Disability Classification Systems, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 607, 607 (2009).
109. Id. at 622.
110. See generally Perlin, Sanist Lives, supra note 3.
111. Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “Mr. Bad Example”: Why Lawyers Need to Embrace 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Root out Sanism in the Representation of Persons with Mental Disabilities,
16 WYO. L. REV. 299, 300 (2016).
112. Morton Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment: Some Comments on Its Development, in 
MEDICAL, MORAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE 97, 107 (Frank Ayd ed., 1974) (quoting 
Kennedy).
113. Michael L. Perlin, “And My Best Friend, My Doctor, Won’t Even Say What It Is I’ve Got”: 
The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735, 
750 (2005).
114. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, “Everybody Is Making Love/Or Else Expecting Rain”: Consider-
ing the Sexual Autonomy Rights of Persons Institutionalized Because of Mental Disability in Forensic 
Hospitals and in Asia, 83 U. WASH. L. REV. 481, 486 (2008). On the “malignancy” of these ste-
reotypes, see Michael L. Perlin, “Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth”: Sanism, Pretextuality, and 
Why and How Mental Disability Law Developed as It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEG. ISS. 3, 30 (1999) 
(hereinafter Perlin, Half-Wracked).
115. Perlin & Cucolo, supra note 106, at 451–52. On how “sanist myths exert especially 
great power over lawyers who represent persons with mental disabilities,” see Perlin, supra
note 108, at 621.
116. Perlin & Schriver, supra note 107, at 394.
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B. Pretextuality
Pretextuality describes the ways in which courts accept testimo-
nial dishonesty—especially by expert witnesses—and engage simi-
larly in dishonest (and frequently meretricious) decision-making.117
This phenomenon is “especially poisonous where courts accept 
witness testimony that shows a ‘high propensity to purposely distort 
their testimony in order to achieve desired ends.’”118 It “breeds cyn-
icism and disrespect for the law, demeans participants, and rein-
forces shoddy lawyering, blasé judging, and, at times, perjurious 
and/or corrupt testifying.”119
C. Heuristics
Heuristics refers to a cognitive psychology construct that de-
scribes the implicit thinking devices that individuals use to simplify 
complex, information-processing tasks. The use of such heuristics 
frequently leads to distorted and systematically erroneous deci-
sions, and it leads decision-makers to ignore or misuse items of ra-
tionally useful information.120 Judges thus focus on information 
that confirms their preconceptions (i.e., confirmation bias), to re-
call vivid and emotionally charged aspects of cases (i.e., the availa-
bility heuristic), and to interpret information that reinforces the 
status quo as legitimate (i.e., system justification biases).121
117. See Michael L. Perlin & Naomi Weinstein, Said I, ‘But You Have No Choice’: Why a 
Lawyer Must Ethically Honor a Client’s Decision About Mental Health Treatment Even If It Is Not 
What S/he Would Have Chosen, 15 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 73, 85 (2016) (“Pre-
textual devices such as condoning perjured testimony, distorting appellate readings of trial 
testimony, subordinating statistically significant social science data, and enacting purported-
ly prophylactic civil rights laws that have little or no ‘real world’ impact, dominate the men-
tal disability law landscape. Judges in mental disability law cases often take relevant literature 
out of context, misconstrue the data or evidence being offered, and/or read such data selec-
tively, and/or inconsistently. Other times, courts choose to flatly reject this data or ignore its 
existence. In other circumstances, courts simply ‘rewrite’ factual records so as to avoid hav-
ing to deal with social science data that is cognitively dissonant with their view of how the 
world ‘ought to be.’”) (citations omitted).
118. Perlin & Cucolo, supra note 106, at 452; see also Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pre-
textuality, Psychiatry and Law: Of “Ordinary Common Sense,” Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive 
Dissonance, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 131, 133 (1991).
119. Perlin, supra note 113, at 750–51. On how courts “employ pretextuality as a ‘cover’ 
for sanist-driven decisionmaking,” see Perlin, Half-Wracked, supra note 114, at 30.
120. Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, “They’re Planting Stories in the Press’’: The 
Impact of Media Distortions on Sex Offender Law and Policy, 3 U. DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 185, 212 
(2013).
121. Eden B. King, Discrimination in the 21st Century: Are Science and the Law Aligned?, 17 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 54, 58 (2011); see also John T. Jost & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Role of 
Stereotyping in System-Justification and the Production of False Consciousness, 33 BRIT. J. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1 (1994); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging 
Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973).
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Especially pernicious is the “vividness” heuristic, through which 
“one single vivid, memorable case overwhelms mountains of ab-
stract, colorless data upon which rational choices should be 
made.”122 The use of these heuristics blinds us “to the ‘gray areas’
of human behavior.”123
D. “Ordinary Common Sense”
Ordinary common sense (OCS) is “a powerful unconscious ani-
mator of legal decision making124 that reflects “idiosyncratic, reac-
tive decisionmaking,”125 and “is a psychological construct that re-
flects the level of the disparity between perception and reality that 
regularly pervades the judiciary in deciding cases involving indi-
viduals with mental disabilities.”126
OCS is self-referential and non-reflective: “‘I see it that way, 
therefore everyone sees it that way; I see it that way, therefore 
that’s the way it is.’”127 Importantly, it is supported by our reliance 
on a series of heuristics-cognitive-simplifying devices that distort 
our abilities to rationally consider information.128 It presupposes 
two “self-evident” truths: “First, everyone knows how to assess an 
individual’s behavior. Second, everyone knows when to blame 
someone for doing wrong.”129
122. Michael L. Perlin, ‘‘The Borderline Which Separated You from Me’’: The Insanity Defense, 
the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of Punishment, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1375, 
1417 (1997); see also Michael L. Perlin, “There’s No Success like Failure/and Failure’s No Success at 
All”: Exposing the Pretextuality of Kansas v. Hendricks, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1247, 1255 n. 51 
(1998) (Behavioral scientists are aware of the power of what Dr. David Rosenhan has charac-
terized as the “distortions of vivid information.” As part of this phenomenon, “concrete and 
vivid information” about a specific case “overwhelms” the abstract data . . . upon which ra-
tional choices are often made.” David Rosenhan, Psychological Realities and Judicial Policies,
STAN. LAW., Fall 1984, at 10, 13–14. Thus, “the more vivid and concrete is better remem-
bered, over recitals of fact and logic.” Marilyn Ford, The Role of Extralegal Factors in Jury Ver-
dicts, 11 JUST. SYS. J. 16, 23, (1986)).
123. Michael L. Perlin, “She Breaks Just Like a Little Girl”: Neonaticide, the Insanity Defense, 
and the Irrelevance of “Ordinary Common Sense,” 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 6 (2003); see 
also Perlin & Cucolo, supra note 106, at 452.
124. Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: “Ordinary Common Sense” 
and Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REV. 3, 22–23, 29 (1990). See Richard K. Sherwin, Dialects 
and Dominance: A Study of Rhetorical Fields in the Law of Confessions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 
737–38 (1988) (OCS is exemplified by the attitude of “[w]hat I know is ‘self evident’; it is 
‘what everybody knows.’”).
125. Perlin, supra note 124, at 29.
126. Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 117, at 87–88.
127. Id. at 88.
128. See Perlin & Cucolo, supra note 106, at 453.
129. Michael L. Perlin, Myths, Realities, and the Political World: The Anthropology of Insanity 
Defense Attitudes, 24 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5, 17 (1996).
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E. In the Context of Strickland Claims
As we demonstrate in Part III, the quality of lawyering done in 
many of the cases in which Strickland claims were raised led inexo-
rably to decisions that reflect the way that these factors continue to 
dominate the legal process. First, the decisions are, by and large, 
pretextual. Cases in which defense lawyers failed to look at any mit-
igation evidence130 even when such evidence was readily available,131
cases in which defense lawyers failed to prepare expert witnesses to 
testify132 or to give psychiatric records to expert witnesses133 or to re-
tain independent expert mental health witnesses,134 and cases in 
130. E.g., Hammond v. Scott, 35 F.3d 559, 1994 WL 499681, at *4, n. 12 (5th Cir. 1994)
(“According to Hammond’s brief, this information included evidence that his father con-
stantly beat his mother, abused his brothers, and raped and sexually abused his sisters (at 
least one time in front of Hammond) and that he was also beaten by his father and mother, 
many times in front of other people, causing his psychological trauma. When Hammond was 
nine, the father was beating the mother and an older brother shot and killed the father in 
the presence of Hammond and other family members. The brother then used a razor to 
mutilate the father’s body. After this, Hammond began to have nightmares, hallucinations 
(primarily about ‘Ozzie’ who directs Hammond to harm others) and to abuse drugs. There 
was also some proof that Hammond is borderline mentally retarded (IQ 77) and suffers 
from severe psycho-pathology as well as paranoia and post-traumatic stress disorder. Anti-
psychotic drugs have reduced the delusions, but Hammond was unable to obtain those 
drugs at the time of the crime.”).
131. See, e.g., Celestine v. Blackburn, 750 F.2d 353, 357 (5th Cir. 1984) (noting that miti-
gating evidence would have consisted of “the testimony of appellant’s relatives, friends, and 
employers who would have asserted appellant’s affection for his family and friends, their 
affection for him, his willingness to work hard without complaint, his conscientiousness and 
dependability, his faith, and his non-violent disposition. Some of the witnesses would have 
pleaded for appellant’s life. Other evidence would have shown that tests in 1973 showed ap-
pellant to have an I.Q. of 69, and that he committed the murder at the age of 25.”).
132. E.g., Allen v. Stephens, 805 F.3d 617 (5th Cir. 2015); Castillo v. Stephens, 640 
Fed.Appx. 283 (5th Cir. 2016).
133. E.g., Brown v. Cain, 104 F.3d 744 (5th Cir. 1997). In Brown, the defendant argued 
that his attorney failed to deliver his medical and juvenile records to his psychiatric expert. 
Id. at 751. Brown bolstered his argument that his psychological expert was “inadequately 
educated” by utilizing a psychiatrist at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing in state court,
who concluded that the defendant “suffered from certain mental disorders that were not 
revealed in expert testimony at trial.” Id. This argument was rejected by the state and district 
courts that ruled this psychiatrist was “the only expert among five retained by Brown” who 
reached that result regarding the identified disorders. This evidence did not establish a 
Strickland violation. Id. at 752.
134. See Appendix A (4) and (5), for lists of cases in which experts were neither utilized 
nor requested. For example, in Clark v. Collins, the defendant argued his attorney failed to 
retain an independent psychiatric evaluation to support a possible insanity defense which 
should be deemed ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland. 19 F.3d 959, 964 (5th 
Cir. 1994). The court rejected Clark’s claim because the psychiatric exam that was conduct-
ed by the psychiatrist at Rusk State hospital on a joint motion by the defense and the state 
“appeared very thorough” and there was “no reason to believe another psychiatrist might 
reach” a different conclusion. Id. Although habeas counsel presented evidence of “two med-
ical opinions in conflict with [the psychiatrist], that “does not impel a contrary finding.” Id. 
In a forthcoming manuscript, one of the authors (MLP) suggests that in some cases involv-
ing defendants with mental disabilities, two experts are required—one to provide an evalua-
tion of the defendant’s mental state, and one to explain to the fact-finders why their ‘ordi-
nary common sense,’ is flawed; see Michael L. Perlin, “Deceived Me into Thinking/I Had
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which defense lawyers failed to present psychiatric evidence in cas-
es in which bona fide incompetency status/insanity defense ques-
tions were raised135 all demonstrate an astonishing level of pre-
textuality by the court. Lawyers’ failure to understand (and 
explain) the textures of mental illness,136 the impact of intellectual 
disability on behavior,137 to even understand when mental illness is 
present138 (and the court’s failure to hold such lawyers up to rea-
sonable performance standards) is sanism of the rankest sort.139 A
non-mental disability-focused case was reversed on non-Strickland
Something to Protect”: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of When Multiple Experts Are Necessary in 
Cases in Which Fact-Finders Rely on Heuristic Reasoning and “Ordinary Common Sense,” L.J. SOC’L
JUST. (forthcoming 2020); supra text accompanying notes 124–29.
135. See Appendix A (3) for a list of cases in which competency questions were not ad-
dressed. By way of example, in Crawford v. Epps, 353 Fed. Appx. 977 (5th Cir. 2009), the de-
fendant claimed that his attorney was ineffective for failing to seek a competency evaluation 
prior to trial, basing his argument on an affidavit by a psychiatrist concluding that Crawford 
was “probably incompetent to stand trial.” Id. at 991. Although both the district and state 
courts agreed that “defense counsel was deficient for failing to seek a competency determi-
nation,” they ruled that the defendant did not suffer “prejudice” under Strickland. Id. In this 
context, consider how the Fifth Circuit has found no prejudice in cases involving textbook 
violations of Ake v. Oklahoma. 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (holding that indigent defendants seeking 
to plead insanity have a right to an independent expert). See, e.g., Crane v. Johnson 178 F.3d 
309, 315 (5th Cir. 1999) (no prejudice in Ake violation); Hood v. Dretke 93 Fed. Appx. 665 
(5th Cir. 2004) (Ake violation harmless error).
136. E.g., Barnard v. Collins, 958 F.2d 634 (5th Cir 1992). In Barnard, the defendant ar-
gued that several months before he committed the capital crime, his son-in law beat him in 
the head with a tire iron. Barnard’s mother testified that since the beating incident, he 
needed “psychiatric help” Id. at 638. Barnard’s argument centered on the fact that his attor-
ney failed “to have a psychological expert evaluate [him, and] . . . failed to obtain a medical 
examination to determine if he suffered from brain damage.” Id. at 641. These arguments 
were rejected by the court, stating “Barnard fails to demonstrate that his counsel [had] rea-
son to believe that Barnard suffered from a mental defect.” Id. at 642.
137. E.g., Bell v. Lynaugh, 828 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1987). In Bell, the defendant argued 
his attorney was ineffective for failing to present or investigate psychiatric evidence of his 
“mental retardation” at the penalty phase of his trial. Id. at 1087. Trial counsel called only 
one witness, the defendant’s mother, who testified to Bell’s low IQ of 54. Id. at 1088. In 
Bell’s first capital trial, two state psychiatrists testified that Bell “was capable of conforming 
his actions to the law, and that he knew right and wrong, and that he had choices,” and con-
cluded that Bell was “a future danger to society.” Id. at 1089. He was “borderline retarded 
but was responsible for his behavior” and he had “decreased impulse control” and was 
therefore “more likely to engage in violent criminal acts” Id. As a result, even though two 
defense experts, a psychiatrist and psychologist, were able to testify to Bell’s low IQ, his 
“mild mental retardation,” and his “defective mental state,” counsel decided not to present 
this evidence in mitigation. Id. However, the court found this decision was reasonable in 
order to avoid damaging state rebuttal evidence. Id. at 1090.
138. E.g., Freeman v. Stephens, 614 Fed. Appx. 180 (5th Cir. 2015). In Freeman, the de-
fendant’s attorney failed to conduct a deeper investigation into his possible mental illness by 
examining the mental history of his family which would have strengthened his argument 
that he suffered from depression, other medical disorders, and possible “toxic exposure” 
causing brain damage. Id. at 186–87. The court rejected the defendant’s argument claiming 
Freeman’s evidence of “brain dysfunction as a result of toxic exposure is classically double-
edged” and may have “increased the jury’s assessment of future dangerousness.” Id. at 187.
139. See Michael L. Perlin, “His Brain Has Been Mismanaged with Great Skill”: How Will Ju-
rors Respond to Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases? 42 AKRON L. REV. 885, 900
(2009) (discussing “sanist myths” upon which jurors rely, including the “sanctioning of the
death penalty in the case of mentally retarded defendants.”).
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grounds in which counsel apparently did not object to “emotional-
ly charged” and inflammatory evidence of the victim’s admirable 
personal characteristics, characteristics which the Court noted was 
“altogether irrelevant to the question of whether David Rushing 
should be put to death,”140 a clear example of the powers of heuris-
tic reasoning.
The role of OCS in such cases is well known.141 By way of exam-
ple, the Supreme Court’s use of public opinion polling in deter-
mining the constitutionality of certain executions142 relied, implicit-
ly, on such ordinary common sense.143 So it is that we use false OCS 
to “generalize and wrongly stereotype persons with mental disor-
ders in order to justify prejudiced decision making against 
them.”144 Also, jurors self-reflectively reject consideration of the sort 
of scientific evidence that must be relied on in efforts to demon-
strate mental impairment as a basis for mitigation, as such evidence 
may be “beyond the understanding of jurors who rely on ordinary 
common sense in decision-making.”145
In short, the use of these factors contaminates these aspects of 
death penalty law,146 and it is impossible, we believe, to understand 
the prevailing case law until we contextualize the decisions in ques-
tion with these factors.
140. Rushing v. Butler, 868 F.2d 800, 804 (5th Cir. 1989).
141. On why this false OCS should be irrelevant in one subset of homicide cases (those 
of neonaticide), see Perlin, supra note 114, at 4.
142. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (using such polling data to support its 
decision that the execution of persons with mental retardation (now, intellectual disability) 
was cruel and unusual punishment).
143. For a critical appraisal, see Tracy E. Robinson, By Popular Demand? The Supreme 
Court’s Use of Public Opinion Polls in Atkins v. Virginia, 14 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 107 
(2004); David A. Singleton, What Is Punishment?: The Case for Considering Public Opinion Under
Mendoza-Martinez, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 435 (2015) (on the punitiveness of certain legis-
lative sanctions).
144. Grant H. Morris, The Evil That Men Do: Perverting Justice to Punish Perverts, 2000 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1201 n. 13 (2000); see also Perlin & Lynch, supra note 111, at 311 n. 76 (cit-
ing Morris, supra note 144).
145. Ellen Byers, Mentally Ill Criminal Offenders and the Strict Liability Effect: Is There Hope for
a Just Jurisprudence in an Era of Responsibility/Consequences Talk?, 57 ARK. L. REV. 447, 499 n. 
336 (2004) (quoting Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insani-
ty Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 679 (1989–90)); see also id. (quoting Ed-
ward J. Imwinkelried, The Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence: A Critique from the Perspec-
tive of Juror Psychology, 28 VILL. L. REV. 554, 564 (1982–83)) (noting that “common sense 
suggests that lay jurors with little or no background in science will have difficulty under-
standing complex, technical testimony”).
146. See Michael L. Perlin, “Your Old Road Is/ Rapidly Agin’”: International Human Rights 
Standards and Their Impact on Forensic Psychologists, the Practice of Forensic Psychology, and the 
Conditions of Institutionalization of Persons with Mental Disabilities, 17 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUDIES 
L. REV. 79, 100 (2018) (noting that sanism and pretextuality contaminate all aspects of men-
tal disability law).
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III. THE DATA
A. Methodology
We examined Strickland claims of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel that involved any aspect of a capital defendant’s mental health. 
In order to identify these specific cases, we used the following steps 
in our methodology. First, we utilized the Westlaw database to ob-
tain a list of relevant cases. Our search was limited to cases raised 
in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which includes cases originat-
ing from Texas, Mississippi, and Louisiana. This circuit was the fo-
cus because it included the vast majority of death penalty cases out 
of all the circuits, because a significant number of the most im-
portant death penalty cases since Strickland that have reached the 
Supreme Court have come from this circuit,147 because the Fifth 
Circuit has shown a stunning disregard of mitigation evidence in 
all sorts of death cases,148 and because, in a parallel area (compe-
tency to be executed), the Fifth Circuit has demonstrated an equal-
ly-stunning disregard for constitutional law.149
The following search terms were used: mental* and “death pen-
alty.” This search generated a list of 355 cases. Next, we completed 
147. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) (competency to be executed); 
Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004) (prosecutorial misconduct); Carol Steiker & Jordan 
Steiker, A Tale of Two Nations: Implementation of the Death Penalty and Executing v. Symbolic States 
of the United States, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1869, 1902 (2006) (noting that “courts within the Fifth 
Circuit were less likely than courts in most other circuits to authorize full appeals of capital 
claims denied in federal district court [and] have also been less inclined to hold evidentiary 
hearings than courts in other circuits . . . .”); id. at 1903 (“The Fifth Circuit has a relatively 
low rate of granting relief in cases addressed on the merits.”). Many other significant death 
penalty cases in the pre-Strickland era also arose in the Fifth Circuit. See, e.g., Barefoot v. Es-
telle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (testimony as to future dangerousness admissible at penalty phase 
in capital punishment case); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1983) (scope of forensic exam-
iner’s duty to inform a criminal defendant of potential disclosure of information shared 
during a forensic interview); see generally PERLIN, supra note 1.
148. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 147, at 1903 (“In the seventeen years since [the 
Supreme Court decided Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)], the Fifth Circuit has de-
nied relief in at least ninety-eight cases involving Penry claims: seventy-two of those inmates 
have already been executed.”); see also Penry, 492 U.S. at 322 (“[M]itigating evidence of men-
tal retardation and childhood abuse has relevance to [a defendant’s] moral culpability [to 
enable a jury] to express its ‘reasoned moral response’ to that evidence in determining 
whether death was the appropriate punishment.”).
149. By way of example, in Panetti v. Quarterman, Panetti’s lawyers had told the Supreme 
Court in their petition for certiorari that two decades had passed since the Supreme Court 
had decided Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), the Supreme Court’s initial modern 
decision on the question of competency to be executed, and that the Fifth Circuit had yet to 
find a single death row inmate incompetent to be executed. Panetti v. Quarterman, 2006 
WL 3880284, at *26 (2006) (appellant’s petition for certiorari). During this same period, 
the State of Texas executed 360 people. Id.; see also Michael L. Perlin, ‘‘Good and Bad, I De-
fined These Terms, Quite Clear No Doubt Somehow’’: Neuroimaging and Competency to be Executed 
after Panetti, 28 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 671, 672 n. 9 (2010).
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an identical search in the LexisNexis database. This search gener-
ated a list of 382 of cases. There were 23 cases that appeared in the 
Westlaw search that did not appear on the LexisNexis search. 
These 23 cases were added to the 382 cases from LexisNexis, mak-
ing a complete list of 405 cases. After closer examination,150 we 
were left with a final list of 198 distinct capital cases in the Fifth 
Circuit that included a Strickland claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel due to a mental disability-related issue which includes 
mental illness and intellectual disabilities.
Of this universe, there were 13 cases (6.5%) in which Strickland 
was the basis of a reversal, a remand, a vacation or a grant of a cer-
tificate of appealability.151 These reversals basically fall into these 
categories:
(a) where the trial attorney admitted unprofessional er-
ror(s) thus disallowing reliance on the ‘strategic 
choice’ rationale posited in Strickland152 (31%);
(b) where the trial attorney exhibited an erroneous under-
standing of state law (23%);
(c) where an insignificant amount of time was spent on the 
case investigation (either the casein main or the penal-
ty phase) (54%);
(d) where the behavior of the defendant before or during 
the trial was, simply, bizarre (15%);153
(e) where the court mentioned multiple errors that result-
ed in egregious cumulative error (15%);154 and
(f) where the defendant argued intellectual disability as 
part of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
(38%).
150. Of these 405 cases, 127 of them were excluded because the Strickland claim did not 
deal with a mental health issue; 27 cases were excluded because they were not capital; 11 
cases did not contain enough information to code the cases accurately, as there was only a 
decision posted to the law database and there was not enough information to code these 
cases properly; 27 cases included a defendant for which the Strickland claim was already 
coded for using a previous court decision; 10 more possible cases were excluded because the 
opinion was written prior to the Strickland decision.
151. See Appendix A (2) and Appendix B. Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2253, the certificate of 
appealability statute, mandates that unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of ap-
pealability, an appeal from the denial of habeas relief may not be taken to the court of ap-
peals. See Moore v. Quarterman, 517 F.3d 781 (5th Cir. 2008).
152. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 699 (1984).
153. See, e.g., Saldaño v. Davis, 701 Fed. App’x 302 (5th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 2019 WL
6107808 (2019); Zimmerman v. Cockrell, 2002 WL 32833097 (5th Cir. 2002).
154. See, e.g., Koon v. Cain, 77 Fed. App’x 381, 386 (5th Cir. 2008), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 165–69; Moore v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 586, 619 (5th Cir. 1999).
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However, even this paltry number of reversals creates a false 
consciousness. When further research is done to determine what 
happened following the remand, we learn that in only one of these 
cases was there an actual ultimate reversal on the merits.155 In all 
others, the conviction was ultimately affirmed, or in a negotiation, 
the defendant agreed to plead to life imprisonment (in all but one 
case without the possibility of parole), and at least one defendant 
has subsequently been executed.156
B. About Cohorts of the Cases
1. Introduction
In this section, we will (1) discuss the thirteen cases in which the 
decision in question was other than an affirmance of the convic-
tion, (2) discuss the “back stories” of those cases as to what hap-
pened following reversal or remand (in those instances where that 
information was available), and (3) also discuss one cohort of the 
nineteen cases in which Strickland claims were rejected, in spite of 
the fact that trial counsel proffered no evidence or testimony on mitigation 
whatsoever. Importantly, in most of the cases in which there were 
successful Strickland arguments made to the Fifth Circuit, there 
were multiple errors found below.157
2. Reversals or Remands
a. Counsel Admission of Error
Trial counsel or the defense expert admitted error in 38% of the 
Strickland reversals. For example, Alvin Scott Loyd was convicted 
and sentenced to death for first degree murder in Louisiana.158
The circuit court ruled that Loyd’s counsel was deficient in not 
procuring a neutral psychological expert to examine the defend-
ant.159 This failure was not the result of a strategic decision, and 
155. See Walbey v. Quarterman, 309 Fed. App’x 795, 2009 WL 113778 (5th Cir. 2009).
156. Kevin Lee Zimmerman. See Appendix B. For a list of all defendants who have been 
executed in the cohort that is the subject of this study, see Appendix A (7). For a list of all 
cases in which convictions were affirmed, see Appendix A (1).
157. See infra text accompanying notes 224–35.
158. See State v. Loyd, 459 So. 2d 498 (1984).
159. Loyd v. Whitley, 977 F.2d 149, 152 (5th Cir. 1992).
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counsel even stated he did not feel competent to handle the 
case.160 At the state habeas hearing, the attorneys expressed dissatis-
faction with their representation of the defendant in the 1985 sen-
tencing trial. The circuit court found that the issue of sanity was 
clearly a critical issue, and, therefore, the subsequent issue of men-
tal health related mitigation was obviously extremely important.161
The decision not to pursue this crucial line of investigation in a 
capital case was deemed professionally unreasonable.162
Another case that provides a striking example of this phenome-
non is the case of Carl Daniel Lockett.163 In the case, Lockett was 
convicted of capital murder in Mississippi and sentenced to 
death.164 The defendant killed two people (a husband and wife) for 
which he was tried separately, convicted, and sentenced to two 
death sentences in a consolidated proceeding.165 During appeals, 
the defendant argued that his Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel was violated, claiming that his defense attor-
ney failed to present any mitigation in the sentencing phase of the 
trial.166 Counsel, in fact, admitted to not spending enough time on 
Lockett’s case due to his mother’s illness and his appointment to 
two other capital murder trials.167 An investigation would have re-
vealed that Lockett suffered from an organic brain abnormality 
and had been previously diagnosed with schizophrenia.168
A third case that exemplifies this problem occurred in the An-
dre Lewis case.169 Lewis’s case was reversed because of the following 
remarkable three reasons: (1) based on the trial attorney’s own 
records, he spent only twelve hours of his time devoted to preparing 
for the penalty phase of the trial; (2) the attorney’s admitted erroneous 
understanding of state law related to mitigation and (3) although 
funds were available, the trial attorney never had the defendant 
undergo psychiatric testing.170 Most pertinent to the issue of coun-
sel admission of error, Lewis’s trial attorney mistakenly thought 
that the mitigation related to childhood abuse and/or mental im-
pairment would be considered an aggravating factor by the jury at 
the sentencing phase of the capital murder trial and that it “was 
not relevant under the special issues in the Texas death penalty 
160. Id. at 157.
161. Id. at 159–60.
162. Id. at 157–60.
163. Lockett v. Anderson, 230 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 2000).
164. See id. at 697.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 710–15.
167. Id. at 711.
168. Id. at 713, 716.
169. Lewis v. Johnson, 2000 US App. LEXIS 38771 (5th Cir. 2000).
170. Id. at *6–10.
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statute.”171 The court ruled that this erroneous understanding of 
state law constituted prejudice under Strickland by not introducing 
the mitigating evidence that was available.172 This case also illus-
trates how other factors such as extremely untimely investigations 
and erroneous understanding of state law may contribute to a 
Strickland reversal.
b. Misunderstanding of State Law
Consider the Strickland reversals that focused on “counsel admis-
sion of error” related to a misunderstanding of the state law (23% 
of the reversals). As previously discussed in the case of Andre Lew-
is, his trial attorney mistakenly thought that the mitigation related 
to childhood abuse and/or mental impairment would be consid-
ered an aggravating factor by the jury.173 As a result, he erroneously 
believed that the defendant’s evidence of abuse at the sentencing 
phase of the capital murder trial was “not relevant under the spe-
cial issues in the Texas death penalty statute.”174 The court ruled 
that this erroneous understanding of state law constituted preju-
dice under Strickland as reflected in counsel’s failure to introduce 
the mitigating evidence that was available.175
The case of Alvin Loyd similarly depicts a similar egregious error 
on the part of trial counsel.176 There, the defendant claimed that 
his defense attorney was ineffective in the penalty phase of his trial 
because he failed to pursue independent psychological evaluations 
for him. The court found that Loyd’s attorney’s decision was based 
upon a failure to understand the difference between the M’Naghten
test for insanity of “mental disease or defect” and the Louisiana 
mitigating factor of “mental or emotional disturbance,”177 and con-
cluded that the attorney’s performance fell below professional 
standards.178
The state court also had found that there had been funds availa-
ble for an independent psychiatric analysis of the defendant.179 The 
court concluded “for counsel not to have sought such an evalua-
171. Id. at *10, *14–15
172. Id. at *19.
173. Id. at *14.
174. Id. at *10.
175. Id. at *19. Lewis was subsequently resentenced to life in prison with the possibility 
of parole. See Email from Richard Ellis, Esq., Lewis’s appellate counsel, to authors of this 
Article, Jan. 21, 2019, infra note 365 (Appendix B).
176. See Loyd v. Whitley, 977 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1992).
177. Id. at 152.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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tion, where funds were available to do so, was an error which falls 
below the professional standards of conduct required to constitute 
proper representation.”180
The defendant’s new habeas counsel hired psychiatrists and psy-
chologists, who examined Loyd after his original sentencing trial, 
and concluded he was psychotic at the time of the murder and 
should have been examined more closely for organic brain dam-
age.181 According to the judges in the Fifth Circuit, there was 
enough evidence proving mental disease and defect that the bal-
ance of aggravating and mitigating factors may have been different 
if the mental health evidence was included.182 The judgment of the 
district court was subsequently reversed, and the case was remand-
ed for a new sentencing hearing. On retrial, Loyd was sentenced to 
life imprisonment.183
c. Insignificant Amount of Time Devoted to the Case
The issue of the lack of time devoted to an investigation was the 
most prevalent factor found among the reversals (46% of the cas-
es). In the case of Koon v. Cain,184 Walter J. Koon was convicted of 
killing his wife and her parents in Louisiana and sentenced to 
death. As part of his appeals, Koon argued that although he had 
had a year to prepare, Koon’s attorney, Kevin Monahan, hired Dr. 
Marc Zimmerman, the psychiatric expert one day before the trial 
and he was only given one hour to interview Koon.185 Due to Mo-
nahan’s procrastination until the last minute, Zimmerman did not 
have time to consult the defendant’s family members or friends be-
fore testifying.186 As a result, the state’s expert produced a devastat-
ing rebuttal based on the many things the defense expert failed to 
produce due to his lack of time to prepare (one day) and his lack 
of time to interview the defendant (only one hour). As cited by the 
court: Monahan was “unprepared” and “made no attempt . . . to 
180. Id. Under Louisiana law, “[i]f the circumstances indicate that because of a mental 
disease or mental defect the offender was incapable of distinguishing between right and 
wrong with reference to the conduct in question, the offender shall be exempt from crimi-
nal responsibility.” LSA-R.S. §14:14 (2017) (restating the M’Naghten rule); see also State v. 
Golston, 67 So. 3d 452, 466 (La. 2011).
181. Loyd, 977 F.2d at 152–56.
182. Id. at 160.
183. Email from John Getsinger, Esq., Loyd’s appellate counsel, to authors of this Arti-
cle, Jan. 20, 2019; see also Appendix B, infra, note 338 and accompanying text.
184. 277 Fed. App’x 381 (5th Cir. 2008).
185. Id. at 387.
186. Id. at 387–88.
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counter the state’s devastating rebuttal.”187 After the Supreme
Court denied the state’s petition for certiorari,188 Koon was subse-
quently sentenced to life without parole.189
Another example of a very limited investigation occurred in the 
case of Walbey v. Quarterman.190 Walbey, who had been convicted of 
capital murder in Texas and sentenced to death, argued on appeal
his attorney did not reach an independent conclusion regarding a 
mitigation defense and delegated that task to an expert (Dr. Wills) 
who was told his role was limited to assessing future dangerous-
ness.191 This expert admitted he spent only two hours preparing the 
case.192 Counsel’s investigation was deemed deficient by a district 
court, as he only scanned several files sent to him on the defend-
ant’s background and subsequently failed to introduce evidence 
from several mental health professionals stating that his client had 
a nightmarish childhood and was borderline “mentally retard-
ed.”193
Moreover, Dr. Wills was not retained until a week before the trial. 
He did not investigate mitigation, he spent very little time prepar-
ing the future dangerousness issue, and he had little time with the 
attorney to prepare to testify. The court also found that the de-
fendant’s psychiatric testimony by Dr. Wills “did severe damage to 
Walbey’s case,” and that, strikingly, Dr. Wills admitted to “feeling 
embarrassment over how poorly prepared to testify he felt.”194 After 
remand, the successor District Attorney in the county where the 
crime took place accepted Walbey’s plea to a life sentence.195
Consider also the very minimal investigation in the case of Trevi-
no v. Davis.196 After Trevino was convicted of murder and sentenced 
to death, he argued that counsel failed to investigate the possibility 
of a Wiggins claim197 which the court ultimately ruled constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel.198 The court ruled the record 
“shows that the minimal investigation conducted by Trevino’s trial 
187. Id. at 384.
188. See Cain v. Koon, 555 U.S. 1010 (2008).
189. John Pope, Lawyer Who Fought Death Penalty Dies at 90, TIMES-PICAYUNE
(Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.nola.com/news/crime_police/article_e2480b59-86be-5cba-
b9ff-a3697f902ef2.html.
190. 309 Fed. App’x 795 (5th Cir. 2009).
191. See id. at 797, 800–01.
192. Id. at 801.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 804 (emphasis added).
195. See Leigh Jones, Cry for Justice: Galveston Teacher’s Murder Prompts Death Penalty Debate,
GALVESTON CRIME SCENE (July 19, 2018), http://www.galvestoncrimescene.com/?p=329.
196. Trevino v. Davis, 829 F.3d 328 (5th Cir. 2016).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 89–92 (discussing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 
(2003)).
198. Trevino, 829 F.3d at 348–49.
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counsel here is remarkably similar to the investigation in Wiggins
that the Supreme Court held to be constitutionally deficient.”199
When describing counsel’s minimal investigation, the court 
stressed: “Not only did Trevino’s counsel do an abysmal job of locat-
ing potential mitigation witnesses, but he failed to elicit easily ob-
tainable information from the few interviews he conducted, most 
notably the whereabouts of Trevino’s mother.”200 In this case, Tre-
vino’s counsel presented “only one mitigation witness and no other 
evidence during the punishment phase.”201 The one mitigation 
witness was Trevino’s aunt, and counsel interviewed her briefly on-
ly on the day of her testimony.202 At the state habeas hearing, trial 
counsel testified “that he knew [Trevino’s] mother had been in 
court—or in the courthouse—at some time before [Trevino’s] tri-
al, but that he was ‘unable to get hold of her.’”203
This led the circuit court to believe that there was a reasonable 
probability that the jury may have decided against death if they 
were provided with the mitigating evidence Trevino claimed 
should have been investigated and presented,204 concluding, 
“[g]iven that Trevino’s life was on the line, reasonable jurists 
would consider the mitigation investigation conducted by his trial 
counsel insufficient.”205 To bolster this argument, trial counsel had 
“acknowledged that information regarding [the defendant’s child-
hood], including his pre-natal exposure to alcohol, was not ex-
plored or presented as potential mitigating factors.”206
Another excellent illustration involves the case of Andre Lewis.207
The case was reversed in part because, based on the trial attorney’s
own records, he spent only 12 hours of his time preparing for the 
penalty phase of the trial (counsel had had eight months to pre-
pare for trial).208 He called no witnesses at the guilt phase and only 
one witness at the punishment phase, the defendant’s grandmoth-
er.209 Based upon discovery by federal habeas counsel, there were 
several character witnesses including the defendant’s high school 
football coach and math teacher, his aunt, and his sister who could 
have testified about Lewis’s abusive childhood and his cognitive 
199. Id. at 350.
200. Id. (emphasis added).
201. Id. at 349 (emphasis added).
202. Id. at 350.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 352 (emphasis added). On rehearing, it was determined that Trevino’s coun-
sel was not ineffective. See infra, text accompanying notes 233–43.
207. Lewis v. Johnson, No. 96-10616, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 38771 (5th Cir. 2000).
208. Id. at *7–8.
209. Id. at *8.
WINTER 2019] A World of Steel-Eyed Death 293
difficulties, but the attorney never contacted these character wit-
nesses.210 The new habeas attorneys discovered that the defendant 
suffered severe childhood physical, psychological, and sexual abuse 
and experts found neurological impairments.211
d. Bizarre Behavior of the Defendant
Two of the Strickland reversals involved extremely bizarre or 
strange factual circumstances related to the defendant’s mental 
health. In the case of Saldaño v. Davis,212 Victor Hugo Saldaño had 
been convicted of capital murder in Texas and sentenced to death. 
During appeals, the defendant claimed that his Sixth Amendment 
right to effective assistance of counsel was violated. Saldaño argued 
that his counsel failed to request a competency hearing despite the 
existence of evidence putting his mental state into question.213
The circuit court ruled in favor of Saldaño by finding his trial 
counsel deficient.214 The defendant had been previously diagnosed 
with several psychotic disorders, and his behavior in the courtroom 
and in jail grew more bizarre throughout the trial.215 The court ruled 
that this was enough reason for counsel to doubt their client’s
competency and should have warranted a competency hearing.216
The court also ruled that counsel’s deficient performance 
caused prejudice to Saldaño’s case, as there seemed to be a rea-
sonable probability that the trial court would have found Saldaño
incompetent to stand trial.217 Dr. Orlando Peccora, a psychiatrist 
who treated Saldaño at the Jester IV Psychiatric Facility of the Tex-
as Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) submitted a declaration 
in which he diagnosed the defendant with depression which 
“sometimes involved psychotic ideations, hallucinations, and delu-
sions.”218 Dr. Peccora also noted the defendant’s “‘diminished cog-
nitive ability’ and ‘diminished ability to react in emotionally ap-
propriate fashion to events around him’” (i.e., the defendant 
masturbated in front of the jury during trial) although he did not 
believe Saldaño was incompetent.219 He attributed the defendant’s
210. Id. at *8–9.
211. Id. at *9. As indicated supra, Lewis was resentenced to life imprisonment with a pos-
sibility of parole.
212. Saldaño v. Davis, 701 F. App’x 302 (5th Cir. 2017).
213. Id. at 315.
214. Id. at 315–16.
215. Cf. id. at 305–06.
216. See id. at 313.
217. Id. at 316.
218. Id. at 305.
219. Id.
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misbehavior to his mental deterioration from isolation on death 
row.220
In the other bizarre case, Zimmerman v. Cockrell,221 Kevin Lee 
Zimmerman had been convicted of capital murder in Texas and 
sentenced to death. During appeals, Zimmerman claimed that his 
defense attorney failed to investigate his mental health related to 
his competency to stand trial.222 The defendant was given a person-
ality inventory (MMPI), and the results of that assessment indicat-
ed it was unlikely Zimmerman would be able to contribute to his 
defense. He also wrote threatening letters to the trial court and 
prosecution, demanding to be charged with capital murder.223
More specifically, the MMPI “evaluation [was] completed three
weeks prior to trial and letters [the defendant] wrote to the trial 
court and prosecutor containing threats and a demand to be 
charged with capital murder.”224
The circuit court ruled that the results of the personality inven-
tory were enough to render the defense counsel deficient, as this 
was a clear signal to further investigate the issue of competency.225
The court also ruled that there was an adequate chance that Zim-
merman was truly incompetent to stand trial, and, therefore, this 
failure to investigate competence severely prejudiced his case.226
The MMPI results concluded that “it is unlikely that [the defend-
ant] could contribute to his own defense at a legal hearing, since his 
behavior is inappropriate and his thoughts are illogical.”227
e. Cumulative Error
Most of the Strickland reversals involved multiple errors that were 
identified in the beginning of this section.228 Importantly, in some 
of the cases, the court mentioned these “cumulative errors” as an-
other reason for the reversal. Notably this occurred in the Bobby 
Moore and the Walter Koon cases. For example, the court ruled 
220. Id.
221. Zimmerman v. Cockrell, No. 01-40591, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 28187, at *1 (5th Cir. 
Aug. 1, 2002).
222. Id. at *1–2.
223. Id. at *25–26.
224. Id. at *25–27 (emphasis added).
225. Id. at *27.
226. Id. at *27–28.
227. Id. at *27 (emphasis added).
228. See generally Ruth A. Moyer, To Err Is Human; to Cumulate, Judicious: The Need for U.S. 
Supreme Court Guidance on Whether Federal Habeas Courts Reviewing State Convictions May Cumu-
latively Assess Strickland Errors, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 447 (2013) (discussing the various issues 
and questions raised in the event that multiple errors occur).
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that counsel prejudiced Moore’s case, as his failure to present mit-
igation removed any hope of convincing the jury to spare the de-
fendant’s life.229 Counsel completely failed to investigate Moore’s
background and offered no mitigating evidence at the punishment 
phase which concluded in “less than ten minutes.”230 The court 
found that counsel’s complete failure to present mitigating evi-
dence did not make “common sense” and was unreasonable.231
Counsel should have presented mental health mitigation related to 
his mental development and functioning and borderline IQ to 
counter the damaging and misleading evidence offered by the 
prosecution, and the failure to do so resulted in a prejudicial death 
sentence for the defendant. In fact, the court concluded that trial 
counsel’s “cumulative errors” resulted in Moore’s punishment 
phase being unreliable.232
Moreover, in the Koon case,233 the district court found that de-
fense counsel’s conduct was deficient based upon four “crucial 
mistakes” which resulted in cumulative “egregious[]” error.234 The 
attorney failed to interview the only eyewitness to the crime, Rob-
inson, and did not have a strategic reason for this failure; the de-
fense attorney waited until the day before the sentencing trial to 
hire the mental health expert, Zimmerman;235 Monahan decided to 
proceed alone on the case without the aid of at least one other at-
torney; and he failed to properly prepare Koon to testify.236 The 
district court ruled that “Monahan’s failure to interview Robinson, 
standing alone, [was] a constitutionally deficient performance; it 
highlighted his other missteps . . . to further emphasize the egre-
giousness of Monahan’s deficient representation” during the guilt 
phase of Koon’s trial and “the cumulative prejudicial effort of 
these multiple deficiencies.”237 The circuit court agreed with the 
district court’s findings, and ruled that “Monahan’s failure to in-
terview Robinson constituted deficient performance per se” and 
highlighted “his last-minute hiring of Zimmerman” as “exacer-
bat[ing] the deficient performance.”238 Counsel did not even at-
tempt to counter the state’s rebuttal against the defense’s expert 
witness, as he was thoroughly unprepared to defend his client. The 
229. Moore v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 586, 610–11 (5th Cir. 1999).
230. Id. at 599.
231. Id. at 619.
232. Id. at 622.
233. Koon v. Cain, 277 F. App’x 381 (5th Cir. 2008).
234. Id. at 386.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
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circuit court also found that defense counsel’s deficient perfor-
mance prejudiced Koon, as there was a reasonable probability that 
the jury would have found Koon guilty of a lesser offense or sen-
tenced him to life in prison rather than death if counsel had not 
acted unreasonably.239
f. Intellectual Disability Claims
Consider now the performance of counsel in cases in which 
there was evidence of defendants’ intellectual disability. There 
were 54 claims based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins v.
Virginia240 out of the total sample of 198 cases (27.2%). Of the 54 
claims, 20 were cases decided pre-Atkins and 34 were cases decided 
post-Atkins. Moreover, only 5 out of the 54 claims were successful.
As a result, in 5 out of the 13 Strickland reversals (38%), a claim of 
intellectual disability seemed to be a prominent factor in the 
court’s decision to rule in favor of the defendants’ ineffective assis-
tance of counsel argument. In the five successful cases, three of the 
cases were decided pre-Atkins (Bobby Moore, David Wilson and 
Larry Jones) and two were decided post-Atkins (Anthony Pierce 
and Edward Busby).
The most compelling case was that of Larry Jones.241 Larry Jones 
was convicted and sentenced to death for a robbery-murder, under 
the felony-murder rule in Mississippi. The defendant argued that 
his counsel was ineffective for failing to present any mitigating fac-
tors at the sentencing phase of the trial. The following mitigating 
factors were not presented at trial and were established at the ha-
beas hearing in the federal district court: most notably, Jones “was 
mentally retarded” and this fact was agreed to by the state, with an 
IQ “of less than 41,” he was emotionally disturbed, he was seven-
teen at the time of committing the crime and the state did not 
prove he had “any intent or role in the homicide.”242 The court 
ruled that counsel’s failure to present any mitigating factors was 
“professionally unreasonable.”243 In addition, this failure was “prej-
udicial to the defendant in that there is a reasonable probability 
that had this evidence been presented, the jury would have con-
cluded that death was not warranted.”244
239. Id. at 388–89.
240. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (finding the execution of a person with 
mental retardation, as it was then characterized, to be cruel and unusual punishment).
241. Jones v. Thigpen, 788 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1986).
242. Id. at 1103 (emphasis added).
243. Id.
244. Id.
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In sum, after careful examination of the thirteen Strickland “re-
versals,”245 the most significant observation is that the reversals are 
so rare because the case circumstances need to be so exceptionally 
shocking for the court to grant relief. Three findings stand out: (1) 
on post-conviction, trial attorneys need to admit unprofessional er-
rors in order to rebut the state’s theory of a “strategic decision”
under the Strickland performance standard; (2) in more than half 
of the reversals, trial counsel spent an exceptionally insignificant 
amount of time on the investigation (typically, the investigation 
lasted for hours or at most a day or two) and (3) in all of the rever-
sals, multiple egregious errors seemed to occur, which points to 
the reluctance of the court in the Fifth Circuit to grant reversals or
certificates of appealability [COA] on this issue. For example, 
among the entire sample of Strickland claims related to mental 
health, only 6.5% (13/198) were successful.
3. “Back Stories”
Again, it is crucial to consider what actually happened in each of 
these cases. As noted above, we were able to determine the current 
status of all but one of the thirteen cases in question. And, where 
information was available,246 this is what we learned:
• One defendant was executed;247
• One was re-sentenced to death, following a Supreme 
Court decision vacating the decision discussed here; 
subsequently, that re-sentence was also vacated;248
• Three other defendants are still on death row; in one 
of these cases, a petition for an en banc hearing before 
the Fifth Circuit is pending;249
245. We use quotation marks here to drive home the point that these decisions rarely 
resulted in any sort of ultimate relief for the defendants. See infra text accompanying notes 
243–48.
246. Some of this came from subsequent published opinions, some from press accounts, 
and some from other web pages. See Appendix B.
247. See U.S.A. Executions – 1977-Present, DEATHPENALTYUSA, 
http://deathpenaltyusa.org/usa/index-Z.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2019); Zimmerman v. 
Cockrell, No. 01-40591 2002 WL 32833097 (5th Cir. Aug. 1, 2002). Zimmerman was execut-
ed two years after that decision.
248. See Moore v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 586 (5th Cir. 1999). Moore was subsequently resen-
tenced to a term of life imprisonment. See Ex parte Moore, No. WR-13,374-052019 WL 
5778063 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 6, 2019), as discussed in Jolie McCullough, Bobby Moore’s 
Death Sentence Is Changed to Life in Prison after Lengthy Court Fights over Intellectual Disabil-
ity, TEX. TRIB. (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.texastribune.org/2019/11/06/texas-bobby-
moore-death-row-life-in-prison-intellectual-disability/.
249. See Saldaño v. Davis, 701 F. App’x 302 (5th Cir. 2017); Busby v. Davis, 677 F. App’x 
884 (5th Cir. 2017); Trevino v. Davis, 829 F.3d 328 (5th Cir. 2016).
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• Two defendants had their death sentences commut-
ed;250
• Five defendants were resentenced to life without pa-
role,251 and
• There is no information available about later devel-
opments in one case.252
On the merits, at subsequent rehearings, just two of this cohort 
of defendants were found to not have received ineffective assis-
tance.253 These were the only cases in which the question of ade-
quacy of counsel was further explored, and in both—the case of 
Carlos Trevino and the case of Edward Lee Busby—the Fifth Cir-
cuit ultimately found, after further remand, that there was no
Strickland error.
In Trevino, trial counsel’s alleged failure to adequately investi-
gate and present certain mitigating evidence at sentencing was 
found to not prejudice petitioner, and thus was not ineffective as-
sistance.254 In reality, Trevino’s lawyer’s work was appalling.255 When 
describing counsel’s minimal investigation, the court, in its initial 
opinion, noted: “Not only did Trevino’s trial counsel do an abysmal 
job of locating potential mitigation witnesses, but he failed to elicit 
easily obtainable information from the few interviews he conduct-
ed, most notably the whereabouts of Trevino’s mother.”256
In this case, Trevino’s counsel presented “only one mitigation 
witness and no other evidence during the punishment phase.”257
The one mitigation witness was Trevino’s aunt, and he interviewed 
her briefly only on the day of her testimony.258 At the state habeas 
hearing, trial counsel testified “that he knew [the defendant’s]
mother had been in court—or at least in the courthouse at some 
250. See Lewis v. Johnson, No. 96-10616 2000 WL 35549205 (5th Cir. Dec. 21, 2000); 
Walbey v. Quarterman, 309 F. App’x 795 (5th Cir. 2009).
251. Wilson v. Butler, 813 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1987); Lockett v. Anderson, 230 F.3d 695
(5th Cir. 2000); Loyd v. Whitley, 977 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1992); Pierce v. Thaler, 355 F. App’x
784 (5th Cir. 2009); Koon v. Cain, 77 F. App’x 381 (5th Cir. 2008). In one of these cases 
(Loyd), a jury imposed the life sentence and new counsel had to hire a bodyguard to protect 
them from angry townspeople. Email from John Getsinger, Esq., Loyd’s appellate counsel, 
to authors (Jan. 20, 2019) (Appendix B).
252. Jones v. Thigpen, 788 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1986). There are no other reported cases, 
and it was impossible to find out anything about this case on the internet. Defense counsel 
has subsequently died, and the state’s attorney did not answer our email.
253. Trevino v. Davis, 829 F.3d 328 (5th Cir. 2016); Busby v. Davis, 677 F. App’x 884 (5th 
Cir. 2017); see supra text accompanying notes 254–68.
254. Trevino, 861 F.3d 545 (5th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1793 (2018).
255. See Trevino, 829 F.3d at 350 (likening the factual circumstances to those that the 
Supreme Court confronted in Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003)); see also supra text ac-
companying notes 90–92 (discussing the factual circumstances in Wiggins).
256. Trevino, 829 F.3d at 350 (emphasis added).
257. Id. at 349 (emphasis added).
258. Id. at 350.
WINTER 2019] A World of Steel-Eyed Death 299
time before [Trevino’s] trial, but that he was ‘unable to get hold of 
her.’”259 The attorney did not interview many mitigation witnesses 
and failed to look into his client’s diagnosis of Fetal Alcohol Spec-
trum Disorder.260
Remarkably, in an affidavit by a defense expert retained for the
federal habeas hearing, Trevino’s trial counsel conceded that little 
work was done on mitigation “as ‘mitigation experts were not used 
very much at the time of the trial.’”261 Of course, by the time of 
Trevino’s trial—sometime after June 1996 when the crime in ques-
tion took place—the Supreme Court had already mandated mitiga-
tion review in multiple cases, dating back to some twenty years pri-
or.262 In fact, writing some years prior to Trevino’s trial, one of the 
authors (MLP) had written, “Contemporary death penalty juris-
prudence requires the sentencing authority to consider any rele-
vant mitigating evidence that a defendant offers as a basis for a 
sentence less than death.”263 And, as noted, Trevino remains on 
death row.264
Busby argued unsuccessfully to the Fifth Circuit that his lawyer 
failed to uncover or present multiple pieces of mitigating evidence 
to the jury:
(1) Busby was abandoned by his mother the first two years 
of his life and instead lived with his grandmother; (2) Bus-
by and his sisters were abused by their mother and father 
and grew up in a violent household; (3) Busby’s hometown 
was segregated and racially-biased; (4) Busby grew up in ex-
treme poverty; (5) Busby was “slow” and suffered from in-
tellectual disability and mental illness; (6) Busby was easily
manipulated by women; and (7) Busby was addicted to 
crack, marijuana, and alcohol.265
259. Id.
260. Id. at 352.
261. Id.
262. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 604 (1978); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989).
263. Perlin, Sanist Lives, supra note 3, at 243.
264. See Carlos Trevino #999235, DEATHROW-USA, http://deathrow-
usa.com/carlos_trevino.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2019).
265. Busby v. Davis, 892 F. 3d 735, 760 (5th Cir. 2018). (“Busby asserted that his mother 
did not obtain prenatal healthcare when pregnant with him. According to Busby’s sisters, 
Busby’s mother was physically violent with her children. She would ‘whoop’ them with a 
‘belt, switch, shoe or extension cord.’ His mother also physically attacked Busby’s father and 
another male with whom she lived after Busby’s father left. Her children often witnessed the 
altercations. In one incident, Busby’s mother attempted to run over the man with whom she 
lived while Busby was in the vehicle with her. Busby’s mother also stabbed a man with whom 
she lived in his hands with a butcher knife when he was attempting to deflect her attacks. 
One sister claimed that Busby’s mother did not love Busby and would tell him that he was 
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Notwithstanding this evidence—and more266—the Fifth Circuit 
concluded that this new mitigation evidence, considered with that 
adduced at trial, “does not outweigh the State’s aggravation evi-
dence such that ‘there is a reasonable probability that at least one 
juror’ would have recommended a life sentence,”267 and thus con-
cluded that he was “therefore not prejudiced by his trial counsel’s
allegedly deficient mitigation investigation.”268
There is no coherence in the dispositional outcomes of the oth-
er cases, but the most likely denouement (via multiple routes) was a 
plea of guilty in exchange for a life-without-parole (LWOP) sen-
tence or the commutation of the death sentence. This was what 
happened in Lockett, Cain and Pierce (LWOP plea) as well as in 
Walbey and Lewis (commutation). There has been one execution 
(Zimmerman). In the Moore case, the Supreme Court struck down 
the Texas Appeals Court ruling in 2017 and sent the case back for 
further review utilizing a test based on more current medical 
standards.269 Although Moore’s prosecutor requested the defend-
ant’s sentence be changed to life in prison, the Court of Criminal 
Appeals again rejected this plea, ruling that Moore was not intel-
lectually disabled under either standard.270 The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari again, and once more held that the Texas court 
was in error in determining that Moore was not intellectually disa-
‘just like [his] sorry-ass daddy.’ They also described Busby’s father as a ‘drunk’ and stated 
that Busby’s ‘dad would hit him with anything’ when he was inebriated. One sister said that 
they were poor, Busby and his siblings were ‘hungry sometimes,’ and the water was once ‘cut 
off for about a week.’ Both sisters described Busby as slow, irresponsible, and unhygienic.”).
266. See id. at 761 (noting that a clinical psychologist diagnosed Busby with bipolar dis-
order).
267. Id. (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 537 (2003)).
268. Id. Busby’s petition for an en banc rehearing is currently pending before the Fifth 
Circuit. Email from David Dow, Busby’s appellate counsel, to MLP (Jan. 20, 2019) (Appen-
dix B).
269. See Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017) (striking down Texas’s schemata for de-
termining if a defendant was sufficiently intellectually disabled for Eighth Amendment viola-
tions). See, e.g., Alexander H. Updegrove, Michael S. Vaughn & Rolando V. del Carmen, In-
tellectual Disability in Capital Cases: Adjusting State Statutes After Moore v. Texas, 32 Notre DAME 
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 527 (2018); Austin Holler, Note, Moore v. Texas and the Ongoing 
National Consensus Struggle Between the Eighth Amendment, the Death Penalty, and the Definition of 
Intellectual Disability, 50 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 415 (2018).
270. See Ex Parte Moore, 548 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018), reversed, 139 S. Ct. 666 
(2019); see also Jolie McCullough, Texas Still Doesn’t Have a Law on Intellectual Disability and the 
Death Penalty. Will That Change This Year? TEXAS TRIB. (Feb. 1, 2019), 
https://www.texastribune.org/2019/02/01/texas-legislature-death-penalty-intellectual-
disability/ (revealing that Texas never statutorily created standards in accordance with the 
Supreme Court’s 2017 decision).
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bled.271 Subsequently, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals resen-
tenced Moore to a term of life imprisonment.272
4. Those Affirmances with No Mitigation
Trial counsel failed to present any mitigating evidence in 19 out 
of the 198 cases (9.6% of the sample). In two of these cases, there 
was a successful Strickland claim and reversal (Larry Jones and Carl 
Lockett). However, in the 17 affirmances, the most common justi-
fication for upholding the death sentence was the court ruling that 
counsel made a “strategic decision” not to present the evidence 
because it would have been seen as “double-edged” and would 
have been used by the jury as aggravating, thus supporting a con-
clusion that the defendant was a future danger.273 By way of exam-
ple, these cases illustrate this important finding:
1) In Garza v. Thaier,274 defense counsel conducted an in-
vestigation into mitigation, but there was a strategic deci-
sion, with Garza’s consent, not to introduce any mitiga-
tion because of a fear that on cross-examination the 
defendant’s prior record would be exposed. The dis-
trict court concluded that the state habeas court “rea-
sonably found that trial counsel made a well-supported 
strategic decision to forgo the presentation of mitigating 
evidence.”275
2) In Cannon v. Johnson,276 Cannon’s attorney presented no 
mitigation at the second trial. At the first trial, mitiga-
tion was presented which resulted in rebuttal evidence 
including evidence of future dangerousness by Dr. 
James Grigson.277 At the second trial, the attorneys ar-
271. Moore, 139 S. Ct. at 672. There was no discussion of the Strickland issues in this opin-
ion. The most recent decision in Moore has since been cited favorably in one case outside of 
the Fifth Circuit. See Commonwealth v. Cox, 204 A.3d 371, 378 n.8 (Pa. 2019).
272. Ex parte Moore, No. WR-13,374-052019 WL 5778063 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 6, 
2019).
273. Vaca v. State, 314 S.W.3d 331, 336 n.4, 337 (Mo. 2010) (“Commentators have noted 
the double-edged nature of such evidence, finding that many jurors hold a presumption of 
an absolute linkage between mental illness and dangerousness.”) (quoting Perlin, Sanist 
Lives, supra note 3, at 258–59).
274. 487 F. App’x 907 (5th Cir. 2012).
275. Id. at 911 (emphasis added).
276. 134 F.3d 683 (5th Cir. 1998).
277. Dr. Grigson was colloquially known as the “killer shrink” who operated “at the brink 
of quackery.” See George Dix, The Death Penalty, “Dangerousness,” Psychiatric Testimony, and 
Professional Ethics, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 151, 172 (1977); David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: 
Assessing the Value Of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1077 
n.268 (1989); Perlin, Half-Wracked, supra note 114, at 28; see also Michael L. Perlin, Therapeu-
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gued that they strategically chose not to present any 
mitigation to avoid rebuttal witnesses and a replay of 
the first trial. As a result, the court upheld the strategy as 
reasonable.
3) In Gates v. Davis,278 the defense did not present any mit-
igating evidence at the punishment phase of the trial. 
The defendant’s attorney stated “to the trial court that 
they had made a diligent effort to contact a couple of 
cousins, but had been unable to locate them.”279 The 
defendant argued that no witnesses were called to testi-
fy because his “defense lawyers never tried to locate any 
or make any investigation of his early life experienc-
es.”280 The specific mitigation the defendant argued in-
cluded: evidence that the defendant suffered from fetal 
alcohol syndrome, a poor upbringing, childhood ne-
glect, sexual assault, and mental difficulties.281 The state 
countered that the defendant never presented this 
claim in state court and therefore the court must pre-
sume the witnesses were unwilling to cooperate or that 
trial counsel made a strategic decision not to present 
mitigating evidence.
4) In Ladd v. Cockrell,282 no mitigation was presented at the 
sentencing phase. There was evidence that the defend-
ant had a low IQ score and the defendant was diag-
tic Jurisprudence: Understanding the Sanist and Pretextual Bases of Mental Disability Law, 20 N.
ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 369, 380 (1994) (explaining that Grigson testified “in 
defiance of all existing professional ethical guidelines”).
Grigson “regularly testified fraudulently on behalf of the state at the penalty phase of 
death penalty cases, even after he lost his license to practice psychiatry, using, in virtually every 
case, ‘junk science’ as the basis of his opinions.” Michael L. Perlin, “Your Corrupt Ways Had 
Finally Made You Blind”: Prosecutorial Misconduct and the Use of “Ethnic Adjustments” in Death 
Penalty Cases of Defendants with Intellectual Disabilities, 65 AM. U.L. REV. 1437, 1440 (2016) 
[hereinafter Perlin, Corrupt Ways]; Marc Sageman, Challenging the Admissibility of Mental Expert 
Testimony, 13 PRAC. LITIGATOR 7, 15 (2002) (characterizing Grigson as “notorious”).
Grigson was decertified by the American Psychiatric Association and the Texas Society 
of Psychiatric Physicians in 1995, but he continued to testify in death penalty proceedings 
for years after that date. See Michael L. Perlin, “Merchants and Thieves, Hungry for Power”: Pros-
ecutorial Misconduct and Passive Judicial Complicity in Death Penalty Trials of Defendants with Men-
tal Disabilities, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501, 1528 (2016) (hereinafter Perlin, Merchants).
Grigson testified in cases included in the cohort studied here. See Johnson v. Cockrell, 306 
F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2002); see generally Gardner v. Johnson, 247 F.3d 551, 556 n.6 (5th Cir. 
2001) (explaining the circumstances behind Dr. Grigson’s loss of his license).
278. Gates v. Davis, 660 F. App’x 270 (5th Cir. 2016).
279. Id. at 272.
280. Id.
281. See id. at 275–76.
282. Ladd v. Cockrell, 311 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2002).
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nosed with “mental retardation” as a child.283 The court 
ruled against the defendant’s ineffective assistance of 
counsel argument because the evidence would have 
been “double edged” as a future danger plus the crime 
was “extremely horrific and the evidence of guilt over-
whelming.”284 The district court found that there was 
deficient performance but that there was no prejudice, 
a finding affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, due to the “hor-
rific” nature of the crime, leading it to conclude that 
the evidence of his future dangerousness was “over-
whelming.”285
5) In Williams v. Cain,286 the trial court had found after an 
evidentiary hearing that the attorney’s “failure to pre-
sent evidence concerning the defendant’s alleged bor-
derline retardation was not deficient because his attor-
ney (Bonnette) was aware that the state could produce 
evidence from three experts to rebut any such testimo-
ny.”287 On appeal, the defendant repeated his state 
court arguments and also argued that his attorney was 
ineffective for failing to investigate his background of 
childhood abuse and his “long history of mental prob-
lems and that he was borderline retarded.”288
Here, the Fifth Circuit ruled that a failure to present a mitiga-
tion case is not per se ineffective assistance of counsel,289 citing 
Stringer v. Jackson,290 a decision subsequently vacated by the Su-
preme Court seven years before the Circuit decided Williams’
case.291
283. Id. at 360. Ladd was decided some four months after the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (finding the execution of a person with mental 
retardation to be cruel and unusual punishment).
284. Id. at 360.
285. Id.
286. Williams v. Cain, 125 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1997).
287. Id. at 277. Of course, this is not fear of testimony as to dangerousness, but rather, 
fear that another expert will come in and defense counsel would be unable to appropriately 
cross-examine him.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 278. The defendant’s attorney arranged for the defendant to be evaluated by 
a clinical psychiatrist, Dr. Strother Dixon. Id. at 277–78. Based on Dr. Dixon’s report, the 
Court concluded that the defendant’s arguments concerning his mental problems and al-
leged “borderline retardation” to be “entirely unavailing.” Id. at 278. Williams, of course, was 
decided five years before the U.S. Supreme Court’s Atkins decision. See Atkins v. Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304 (2002).
290. Stringer v. Jackson, 862 F.2d 1108, 1116 (5th Cir. 1988).
291. See Stringer v. Black, 494 U.S. 1074 (1990).
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C. Conclusions and Findings
According to Professor Janet Moore, after Strickland, “the sub-
stantive meaning of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel turns 
on real-world practices and the resources available to support high-
quality attorney performance.”292 The data demonstrate, beyond 
doubt, that the Strickland test has failed miserably as an aspirational 
bulwark, and that, due to inadequate counsel, defendants with se-
rious mental disabilities continue to have death sentences upheld 
and, in some cases, be executed. To say that Strickland ultimately 
protects defendants is the ultimate pretext.
There are multiple reasons for this, but certainly the sanist atti-
tudes of fact-finders and their reliance on false “ordinary common 
sense” are among the key causes. Consider the recent research of 
Professors Emily Shaw and her colleagues that shows that a signifi-
cant number of mock jurors (selected from a pool of venire-
eligible jurors) simply chose to “not follow the law which clearly 
stated that intellectually disabled individuals cannot be sentenced 
to death.”293 Similarly, a thoughtful study of cases involving defend-
ants with anti-social personality disorder (ASPD) concludes, in the 
context of “ordinary common sense,” that juries and judges alike 
are persuaded by the lay stereotypes involving remorse.”294 “Despite 
the Supreme Court’s clear mandate to avoid the use of lay stereo-
types,295 the lay stereotypes of ASPD continue to prejudice capital 
defendants.”296
It goes without saying that the Fifth Circuit complicitly endorses 
these biases and prejudices in the vast majority of its decisions in 
this area of law.
292. Janet Moore, Isonomy, Austerity, and the Right to Choose Counsel, 51 IND. L. REV. 167, 
174 (2018). Professor Moore is one of the leaders of the Indigent Defense Research Associa-
tion. See Andrew L.B. Davies & Janet Moore, Critical Issues and New Empirical Research in Public 
Defense: An Introduction, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 337 (2019).
293. Emily V. Shaw, Nicholas Scurich & David L. Faigman, Intellectual Disability, the Death 
Penalty, and Jurors, 58 JURIMETRICS 437, 456 (2018).
294. Dale F. Ogden, Executed for Their Disabilities, 39 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 304, 319 
(2018). On the impact of juror perceptions of remorse in death penalty cases (and how those 
perceptions may be wildly inaccurate, especially in cases in which defendants are medicated 
at their trials), see Perlin, Merchants, supra note 277, at 1531 (discussing Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence in Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 142-44 (2002)); William Geimer & Jonathan 
Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15
AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 51–53 (1988).
295. See Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1052 (2017).
296. Ogden, supra note 294, at 320.
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IV. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE297
A. Its Meaning
Therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) recognizes that, as a therapeutic 
agent, the law can have therapeutic or anti-therapeutic conse-
quences.298 It asks whether legal rules, procedures, and lawyer roles 
can or should be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential 
while not subordinating due process principles.299 Professor David 
Wexler clearly identifies how the inherent tension in this inquiry 
must be resolved: the law’s use of “mental health information to 
improve therapeutic functioning [cannot] impinge upon justice 
concerns.”300 As one of the authors (MLP) has written elsewhere, 
“An inquiry into therapeutic outcomes does not mean that thera-
peutic concerns ‘trump’ civil rights and civil liberties.”301 Therapeu-
tic jurisprudence “look[s] at law as it actually impacts people’s
lives,”302 and TJ supports “an ethic of care.”303 It attempts to bring 
about healing and wellness,304 and to value psychological health.305
In an earlier article about prosecutorial misconduct in death 
penalty cases, one of the authors (MLP) considered that issue in 
the context of therapeutic jurisprudence, and said this:
As stated flatly by Judge Juan Ramirez and Professor Amy 
Ronner, “the right to counsel is . . . the core of therapeutic 
297. This section is largely adapted from Michael L. Perlin, “I’ve Got My Mind Made Up”: 
How Judicial Teleology in Cases Involving Biologically Based Evidence Violates Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence, 24 CARD. J. EQUAL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 81, 93–95 (2018) [hereinafter Perlin, Mind Made 
Up]; see also Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “In the Wasteland of Your Mind”: Criminology, 
Scientific Discoveries and the Criminal Process, 4 VA. J. CRIM. L. 304 (2016). Further, it distills the 
work of one of the authors (MLP) over the past twenty-seven years, beginning with Michael 
L. Perlin, What Is Therapeutic Jurisprudence?, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 623 (1993). See gener-
ally on the development of the doctrine of therapeutic jurisprudence, Michael L. Perlin, 
“Have You Seen Dignity?”: The Story of the Development of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 27 U.N.Z. L.
REV. 1135 (2017); Michael L. Perlin, “Changing of the Guards”: David Wexler, Therapeutic Juris-
prudence, and the Transformation of Legal Scholarship, 69 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 3 (2019).
298. Perlin, supra note 139, at 912.
299. Perlin, supra note 113, at 751.
300. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Concepts of Legal Scholarship,
11 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 17, 21 (1993).
301. Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 412 (2000).
302. Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives on Dealing with Victims 
of Crime, 33 NOVA L. REV. 535, 535 (2009).
303. Perlin, Mind Made Up, supra note 297, at 94 (quoting, in part, Bruce J. Winick & 
David B. Wexler, The Use of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Law School Clinical Education: Trans-
forming the Criminal Law Clinic, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 605, 605–07 (2006)).
304. Id. (citing Bruce Winick, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Model for Civil Commitment, in
INVOLUNTARY DETENTION & THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
CIVIL COMMITMENT 23, 26 (Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton eds., 2003)).
305. Id.
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jurisprudence.”306 “Any death penalty system that provides 
inadequate counsel and that, at least as a partial result of 
that inadequacy, fails to insure that mental disability evi-
dence is adequately considered and contextualized by 
death penalty decision-makers, fails miserably from a ther-
apeutic jurisprudence perspective.” If counsel in death 
penalty cases fails to meet constitutional minima, it strains 
credulity to argue that such a practice might comport with 
TJ principles. TJ is the perfect mechanism “to expose [the 
law’s] pretextuality” because this pretextuality is clear in 
the death penalty context.307
Well over twenty years ago, one of the authors (MLP) concluded 
that “any death penalty system that provides inadequate counsel 
and that, at least as a partial result of that inadequacy, fails to in-
sure that mental disability evidence is adequately considered and 
contextualized by death penalty decision-makers, fails miserably 
from a therapeutic jurisprudence perspective.”308 Sadly, little has 
been written since about the relationship between TJ and the 
death penalty.309 Some twenty years ago, the late Bruce Winick ar-
gued persuasively that TJ prohibited the execution of seriously 
mentally ill offenders as that could not adequately serve the goals 
of retribution and deterrence.310 More recently, and from a very 
different perspective, Cynthia Adcock—a law professor who spent 
thirteen years representing death penalty defendants—focused on 
306. Juan Ramirez Jr. & Amy D. Ronner, Voiceless Billy Budd: Melville’s Tribute to the Sixth 
Amendment, 41 CAL. W. L. REV. 103, 119 (2004).
307. Perlin, Merchants, supra note 277, at 1542 (quoting, in part, Perlin, Executioner’s Face, 
supra note 3, at 235; Michael L. Perlin, “Things Have Changed”: Looking at Non-Institutional 
Mental Disability Law Through the Sanism Filter, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 535, 544 (2003)). We 
agree completely with forensic psychologist Kathy Faulkner Yates, who has urged the use of 
therapeutic jurisprudence as a “diagnostic tool to identify the malignant way that pretextual-
ity poisons forensic and judicial relationships.” Kathy Faulkner Yates, Therapeutic Issues Asso-
ciated with Confidentiality and Informed Consent in Forensic Evaluations, 20 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. &
CIV. CONFINEMENT 345, 357–58 (1994).
308. Perlin, Executioner’s Face, supra note 3, at 235. David Wexler and Bruce Winick fore-
saw this nearly thirty years ago. See Therapeutic Jurisprudence as a New Approach to Mental Health 
Law Policy Analysis and Research, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 979 (1991) (applying TJ to cases involv-
ing incompetent death row inmates).
309. For an important recent international law-focused article, see Muhammad Amir 
Munir, Judging in a Therapeutic Way: TJ Audit of Juvenile, Probation and Criminal Procedure Law 
in Pakistan with Reference to Therapeutic Design and Therapeutic Application of Law, in THE 
RESPONSIVE JUDGE 241, 248 (Tania Sourdin et al eds., 2018) (“If the legal actors are not 
friendly to TJ practices as reflected in [Pakistani statutory law] there is a chance that a child 
may suffer the death penalty through no fault of their own.”).
For another consideration of the death penalty and TJ in the context of family survivors,
see Marilyn Peterson Armour & Mark S. Umbreit, Assessing the Impact of the Ultimate Penal 
Sanction on Homicide Survivors: A Two State Comparison, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (2012).
310. Bruce Winick, The Supreme Court’s Evolving Death Penalty Jurisprudence: Severe 
Mental Illness as the Next Frontier, 50 B.C. L. REV. 785, 854–58 (2009).
WINTER 2019] A World of Steel-Eyed Death 307
the “psychological devastation caused by the death penalty on 
those who the lawmakers do not intend to be the target of death 
penalty laws.”311 But there is so much more to consider.
B. In the Context of These Cases
It is fatuous to even consider whether the therapeutic principles 
to which the creators of TJ have aspired312 are part of either the tri-
als of the defendants in this cohort of cases or the actions by coun-
sel. Certainly, “socio-psychological insights into the law and its ap-
plication”313 are utterly lacking, as is any shred of evidence of a
“commitment to dignity.”314 The caselaw is totally bereft of those 
TJ-required fair process norms such as a meaningful right to coun-
sel that “operate as substantive and procedural restraints on state 
power to ensure that the individual suspect is treated with dignity 
and respect.”315
For one example, prosecutors who call expert witnesses—such as
Dr. Grigson316—knowing that the “scientific bases” of the experts’
testimony are worthless, baseless (perhaps, at this point in time, 
fraudulent), and pretextual,317 are similarly “invalidat[ing]the legit-
imacy of the proceedings in question.”318 As one of the authors 
(MLP) has stated elsewhere, “our entire capital punishment system 
311. Cynthia F. Adcock, The Collateral Anti-Therapeutic Effects of the Death Penalty, 11 FLA.
COASTAL L. REV. 289, 293 (2010); see David C. Yamada, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Prac-
tice of Legal Scholarship, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 121, 138–39 (2010) (discussing Adcock’s work, 
and noting that Adcock “reminds us of emotional consequences of law and legal systems
that are all too easy to ignore”).
312. See, e.g., Janet Gilbert et al., Applying Therapeutic Principles to a Family-Focused Juvenile 
Justice Model (Delinquency), 52 ALA. L. REV. 1153 (2001).
313. Ian Freckelton, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Misunderstood and Misrepresented: The Price 
and Risks of Influence, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 575, 576 (2008).
314. Michael L. Perlin, “Yonder Stands Your Orphan with His Gun”: The International Hu-
man Rights and Therapeutic Jurisprudence Implications of Juvenile Punishment Schemes, 46 TEXAS 
TECH L. REV. 301, 333 (2013) (citing BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC 
JURISPRUDENCE MODEL 161 (2005)).
315. Michael L. Perlin & Naomi M. Weinstein, “Friend to the Martyr, a Friend to the Woman 
of Shame”: Thinking About the Law, Shame and Humiliation, 24 SO. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 1,
12 (2014) (quoting, in part, Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The 
Warren and Burger Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 200 (1983)).
316. See Cannon v. Johnson, 134 F.3d 683, 686–87 (5th Cir. 1998), discussed supra text 
accompanying note 276. See also, e.g., Little v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 855, 858 (5th Cir. 1998) (in 
which counsel did not introduce any rebuttal psychiatric testimony); Moody v. Johnson, 139 
F.3d 477, 484 (5th Cir. 1998) (“We also note that even if Dr. Grigson’s testimony might have 
been misleading there is not a reasonable likelihood that its correction would have affected 
the jury’s verdict.”).
317. See Perlin, Half-Wracked, supra note 114, at 27–28 (discussing Charles M. Sevilla, Anti-
Social Personality Disorder: Justification for the Death Penalty?, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 247, 
259–61 (1999)).
318. Perlin, Merchants, supra note 277, at 1542.
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mocks those principles of TJ that we must embrace if we are to 
have a coherent and legitimate criminal procedure system.”319
These Fifth Circuit cases are squarely part of the system’s incoher-
ence and illegitimacy.
CONCLUSION
The story of how the Fifth Circuit has dealt with Strickland ap-
peals in cases involving defendants with mental disabilities facing 
the death penalty is bizarre and frightening. In virtually all cases, 
Strickland errors—often egregious errors—were ignored, and in 
over a third of the cases in which they were acknowledged, defense 
counsel had confessed error.320 Regularly, this Court affirmed con-
victions (in multiple cases leading to sanctioned executions)321 in 
cases where counsel introduced no mitigating evidence,322 failed to 
retain mental health experts,323 and failed to read mental health 
records.324 In the aggregate, the Fifth Circuit regularly and consist-
ently mocked the idea of adequate and effective counsel.
Making a grim picture even grimmer, in that small category of 
reversals, remands, or court of appeals grants, at least one defend-
ant has since been executed,325 and, as far as our research could de-
termine,326 only one stands even the likelihood of ever being pa-
roled.327
We have known since soon after Strickland was decided that most 
defendants in the circumstances of these defendants (facing the 
death penalty and with a mental disability)—especially in jurisdic-
tions where there were no dedicated offices to provide representa-
tion in such cases328—received sub-standard representation. That is 
319. Id.; see also Perlin, Corrupt Ways, supra note 277, at 1457 (asking, from a TJ perspec-
tive, for a “serious reevaluation of the roles of expert witnesses in testifying to ‘future dan-
gerousness’ in death penalty cases.”).
320. See supra text accompanying notes 158–70.
321. See infra app. A (6).
322. See supra text accompanying notes 250–67.
323. See app. A (4). See Zimmerman v. Cockrell, No. 01-40591, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 
28187, at *1 (5th Cir. Aug. 1, 2002).
324. See Zimmerman, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 28187, at *1.
325. Kevin Lee Zimmerman, MURDERPEDIA, http://murderpedia.org/male.Z/z1/
zimmerman-kevin-lee.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2019); app. B.
326. As we indicated, we have been unable to determine the fate of Larry Jones. See su-
pra note 248; infra app. B.
327. Andre Lewis. See email from Richard Ellis, Esq., Lewis’s appellate counsel, to au-
thors (Jan. 21, 2019), infra app. B.
328. Federally funded resource centers to assist in death penalty cases were defunded in 
the 1990s, though many of these were subsequently resurrected as nonprofit organizations. 
See Russell Stetler, The Past, Present, and Future of the Mitigation Profession: Fulfilling the Constitu-
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not news. But, looking at the way the Fifth Circuit ignored the real-
ity of the trials (and the pre-trial work of counsel) is extraordinarily 
disconcerting. The combination of the Fifth Circuit’s minimization 
of Strickland standards and the all-too-frequent ineffectiveness of 
counsel (both in cases in which there were affirmances and cases 
in which there was reversals) has created a truly toxic world of 
criminal procedure.
These cases reflect—on the part of trial counsel and the 
courts—the rankest and vilest sort of sanism and pretextuality. 
They are textbook examples of how the vividness heuristic and 
false “ordinary common sense” have utterly contaminated the judi-
cial process in such matters. They also reject every tenet and prin-
ciple of therapeutic jurisprudence. To say that they do not reflect 
“an ethic of care”329 is to belabor the obvious. To say they encour-
age attempts “to bring about healing and wellness”330 is absurd. To 
say they “value psychological health” is frivolous. As one of the au-
thors (MLP) wrote over twenty years ago, our system of death pen-
alty adjudication—from this TJ perspective—”fails miserably.”331
The song from which we drew for the title of this Article, Shelter 
from the Storm, again, reflects a “mythic image of torment.”332 But, 
unlike the song, there is nothing “mythic” about this “world of 
steel-eyed death” that has confronted every defendant in every case 
which we write about. Convictions are affirmed in cases that should 
have met the old “farce and mockery” test333 that was abandoned in 
Strickland, decisions that are an embarrassment to our system of 
criminal law and procedure. Our hopes are that changes in the way 
capital counsel are evaluated in the future in the states that com-
prise this circuit will be taken more seriously.
We are failing capital defendants with mental disabilities until 
we can hold counsel to a higher standard of performance. Ulti-
mately, short of simply abolishing capital punishment, we must en-
sure that defendants who clearly do not represent “the worst of the 
worst” (but whose lawyers often are) do not receive the ultimate 
sanction.
tional Requirement of Individualized Sentencing in Capital Cases, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1161, 1176–
78 (2018).
329. Perlin, Mind Made Up, supra note 297, at 94.
330. Id.
331. Perlin, Executioner’s Face, supra note 3, at 235.
332. Perlin & Dlugacz, supra note 13, at 677 (quoting GILL & ODEGARD, supra note 13, at 
163).
333. See supra note 57 (quoting United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir. 1949), 
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 950 (1950)).
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Thompson, John John Thompson v. Cain 161 F. 3d 802 (5th Cir. 1998)
Thompson, 
Robert
Robert Thompson v. 
Quarterman
292 Fed. Appx. 277 (5th Cir. 
2008)
Titsworth, 
Timothy
Timothy Titsworth v. 
Dretke
401 F. 3d 301 (5th Cir. 2005)
Van Alstyne, 
Gregory
Gregory Van Alstyne v. 
Cockrell
2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 29069 
(5th Cir. 2002)
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Valle, Yosvannis Yosvannis Valle v. 
Quarterman
2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 22165 
(5th Cir. 2008)
West, Robert Robert West v. Johnson 92 F. 3d 1385 (5th Cir. 1996)
Whitaker, George George Whitaker v. 
Quarterman 
200 Fed. Appx. 351 (5th Cir. 
2006)
White, Robert Robert White v. Johnson 153 F. 3d 197 (5th Cir. 1998)
Wilkerson, 
Richard
Richard Wilkerson v. 
Collins
950 F. 2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1992)
Williams, Walter Walter Williams v. Collins 16 F. 3d 626 (5th Cir. 1994)
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5. STRICKLAND CASES IN WHICH TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO UTILIZE 
MENTAL HEALTH EXPERT (N=18/198=9%)
Defendant name: Title: Case Citation:
Alan, Guy Guy Alan v. Stephens 619 Fed Appx. 280 (5th Cir. 
2015)
Bernard, Brandon U.S. v. Brandon Bernard 762 F 3d 467 (5th Cir. 2014)
Brown, John John Brown v. Cain 104 F. 3d 744 (5th Cir. 1997)
Castillo, Juan Juan Castillo v. Stephens 640 Fed. Appx 283 (5th Cir. 
2016)
Crawford, Charles Charles Crawford v. Epps 353 Fed. Appx. 977 (5th Cir. 
2009)
Dowthitt, Dennis Dennis Dowthitt v. 
Johnson
230 F. 3d 733 (5th Cir. 2000)
Gallamore, 
Samuel
Samuel Gallamore v. 
Cockrell
2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 31510 
(5th Cir. 2001)
Gentry, Kenneth Kenneth Gentry v. 
Johnson
1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 43513 
(5th Cir. 1996)
King, John John King v. Davis 703 Fed. Appx. 320 (5th Cir. 
2017)
LaGrone, Edward Edward LaGrone v. 
Cockrell
2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 18150 
(5th Cir. 2003)
Lincecum, Kavin Kavin Lincecum v. 
Collins
958 F. 2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1992)
Patterson, Kelsey Kelsey Patterson v. 
Cockrell
2033 U.S. App. LEXIS 28033 
(5th Cir. 2003)
Raby, Charles Charles Raby v. Dretke 78 Fed. Appx. 324 (5th Cir. 
2003)
Roberts, Douglas Douglas Roberts v. 
Dretke
381 F. 3d 491 (5th Cir. 2004)
Turner, Edwin Edwin Turner v. Epps 412 Fed. Appx. 696 (5th Cir. 
2011)
Walbey, Gaylon Gaylon Walbey v. 
Quarterman 
309 Fed. Appx. 795 (5th Cir. 
2009)
Woodard, Robert Robert Woodard v. 
Thaler
414 Fed. Appx. 675 (5th Cir. 
2011)
Yowell, Michael Michael Yowell v. Thaler 442 Fed. Appx. 100 (5th Cir. 
2011)
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6. STRICKLAND CASES IN WHICH THERE WAS NO MITIGATION 
PRESENTED, AND DEFENDANT WAS ULTIMATELY EXECUTED 
(N=19/198=9.6% NO MITIGATION) AND (N=14/19 EXECUTIONS 
WHEN NO MITIGATION PRESENTED OR 73.7%)
Defendant Name: Title: Case Citation:
Amos, Bernard Bernard Amos v. Scott 61 F. 3d 333 (5th Cir. 1995) 
executed in TX 12/6/95
Bishop, Dale Dale Bishop v. Epps 265 Fed. Appx. 285 (5th Cir. 
2008) executed in MS 7/23/08
Brawner, Jan Jan Brawner v. Epps 439 Fed. Appx. 396 (5th Cir. 
2011) executed in MS in 
6/12/12
Cannon, Joseph Joseph Cannon v. 
Johnson 
134 F. 3d 683 (5th Cir. 1998) 
executed in TX in 4/22/98
Faulderv, Joseph Joseph Faulderv v. 
Johnson
81 F. 3d 515 (5th Cir. 1996) 
not executed
Garza, Robert Robert Garza v. Thaler 487 Fed. Appx. 907 (5th Cir. 
2012) executed in TX 9/19/13
Gates, Bill Bill Gates v. Davis 660 Fed. Appx. 270 (5th Cir. 
2016) not executed
Hammond, Karl Karl Hammond v. Scott 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 43045 
(5th Cir. 1994) executed in 
Texas 6/21/95
Jones, Larry Larry Jones v. Thigpen 788 F. 2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1986) 
reversal
Ladd, Robert Robert Ladd v. Cockrell 311 F. 3d 349 (5th Cir. 2002) 
executed in TX on 1/29/15
Lockett, Carl Carl Lockett v. 
Anderson
230 F. 3d 695 (5th Cir. 2000) 
reversed
Mann, Fletcher Fletcher Mann v. Scott 41 F. 3d 968 (5th Cir. 1994) 
executed in TX 6/1/95
Mattheson, Howard Howard Mattheson v. 
King
751 F. 2d 1432 (5th Cir. 1985) 
not executed
Roberts, Douglas Douglas Roberts v. 
Dretke
381 F. 3d 491 (5th Cir. 2004) 
executed in TX on 4/20/05
Shore, Anthony Anthony Shore v. Davis 845 F. 3d 627 (5th Cir. 2017) 
executed in TX on 1/8/18
Smith, Charles Charles Smith v. 
Quarterman
471 F. 3d 565 (5th Cir. 2006) 
executed in TX on 9/16/01
West, Robert Robert West v. Johnson 92 F. 3d 1385 (5th Cir. 1996) 
executed in TX on 7/29/97
Williams, Dobie Dobie Williams v. Cain 125 F. 3d 269 (5th Cir. 1997) 
executed in LA on 1/8/99
Williams, Walter Walter Williams v. 
Collins
16 F. 3d 626 (5th Cir. 1994) 
executed in TX on 10/5/94
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7. STRICKLAND CASES IN WHICH DEFENDANT HAS BEEN EXECUTED 
(N=123/198 OR 62.12% OF ENTIRE SAMPLE OR 123/185 OR 66.48%
OF THE AFFIRMANCES)
Defendant 
name:
Title: Case citation: Date 
executed
State:
Adanandus, 
Dwight
Dwight 
Adanandus v. 
Johnson 
1997 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 43223 
(5th Cir. 1997)
10/01/1997 TX
Alexander, 
Gut
Gut Alexander v. 
Quarterman 
198 Fed. Appx. 
354 (5th Cir. 
2006)
N/A TX
Alan, Guy Guy Alan v. 
Stephens 
619 Fed Appx. 
280 (5th Cir. 
2015)
N/A TX
Amos, 
Bernard
Bernard Amos v. 
Scott
61 F. 3d 333 
(5th Cir. 1995)
12/06/1995 TX
Anderson, 
Larry
Larry Anderson 
v. Collins
18 F. 3d 1208 
(5th Cir. 1994)
04/26/1994 TX
Andrews, 
Maurice 
Maurice Andrews 
v. Collins
21 F. 3d 612 
(5th Cir. 1994)
N/A TX
Austin, Perry Perry Austin v. 
Davis
876 F. 3d 757 
(5th Cir. 2017)
N/A TX
Avila, 
Rigoberto
Rigoberto Avila v. 
Quarterman 
560 F. 3d 299 
(5th Cir. 2009)
N/A TX
Ayesta, 
Carlos
Carlos Ayesta v. 
Stephens 
817 F. 3d 888 
(5th Cir. 2016)
N/A TX
Baltazar, 
John
John Baltazar v. 
Cockrell
2002 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 28570 
(5th Cir. 2002)
01/15/2003 TX
Banks, 
Delma
Delma Banks v. 
Cockrell 
2002 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 28401 
(5th Cir. 2002)
N/A TX
Barbee, 
Stephen
Stephen Barbee 
v. Davis
660 Fed. Appx. 
293 (5th Cir. 
2016)
N/A TX
Barnard, 
Harold
Harold Barnard 
v. Collins 
958 F. 2d 634 
(5th Cir. 1992)
02/02/1994 TX
Battaglia, 
John
John Battaglia v. 
Stephens
621 Fed. Appx. 
781 (5th 
Cir.2015)
02/01/2018 TX
Beets, Betty Betty Beets v. 
Collins
986 F. 2d 1478 
(5th Cir. 1993)
02/24/2000 TX
Bell, 
Frederick
Frederick Bell v. 
Epps 
347 Fed. Appx. 
73 5th Cir. 
(2009)
N/A MS
Bell, Walter Walter Bell v. 
Lynaugh
828 F. 2d 1085 
(5th Cir. 1987)
N/A TX
Belyeu, 
Clifton
Clifton Belyeu v. 
Scott
67. F. 3d 535 
(5th Cir. 1995)
05/16/1997 TX
Bishop, Dale Dale Bishop v. 
Epps
265 Fed. Appx. 
285 (5th Cir. 
07/23/2008 MS
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2008)
Black, 
Robert
Robert Black v. 
Collins
962 F. 2d 394 
(5th Cir. 1992)
05/22/1992 TX
Blanton, 
Reginald
Reginald Blanton 
v. Quarterman
543 F. 3d 230 
(5th Cir. 2008)
10/27/2009 TX
Boyd, 
Charles
Charles Boyd v. 
Johnson
167 F. 3d 907 
(5th Cir. 1999)
08/05/1999 TX
Boyle, 
Herbert
Herbert Boyle v. 
Johnson
93 F. 3d 180 
(5th Cir. 1996)
N/A TX
Braziel, Alvin Alvin Braziel v. 
Stephens
631 Fed. Appx. 
225 (5th Cir. 
2015)
12/11/2018 TX
Brawner, Jan Jan Brawner v. 
Epps 
439 Fed. Appx. 
396 (5th Cir. 
2011)
06/12/2012 MS
Brown, 
Arthur
Arthur Brown v. 
Thaler
684 F. 3d 482 
(5th Cir. 2012)
N/A TX
Brown, John John Brown v. 
Cain
104 F. 3d 744 
(5th Cir. 1997)
04/24/1997 LA
Byrne, 
Edward
Edward Byrne v. 
Butler
845 F. 2d 501 
(5th Cir. 1988)
N/A LA
Cannon, 
Joseph
Joseph Cannon v. 
Johnson 
134 F. 3d 683 
(5th Cir. 1998)
04/22/1998 TX
Cantu, Ivan Ivan Cantu v. 
Thaler
632 F. 3d 157 
(5th Cir. 2011)
N/A TX
Cantu, 
Ruben
Ruben Cantu v. 
Collins
967 F. 2d 1006 
(5th Cir. 1992)
08/23/1993 TX
Carter, 
Robert
Robert Carter v. 
Johnson
131 F. 3d 452 
(5th Cir. 1997)
05/31/2000 TX
Castillo, Juan Juan Castillo v. 
Stephens
640 Fed. Appx 
283 (5th Cir. 
2016)
05/16/2018 TX
Celestine, 
Willie
Willie Celestine v. 
Blackburn
750 F. 2d 353 
(5th Cir. 1984)
07/20/1987 LA
Charles, 
Derrick
Derrick Charles 
v. Stephens
736 F. 3d 380 
(5th Cir. 2013)
05/12/2015 TX
Chase, Ricky Rickey Chase v. 
Epps
83 Fed. Appx. 
673 (5th Cir. 
2003)
N/A MS
Clark, David David Clark v. 
Collins
756 F. 2d 68 
(1992)
02/28/1992 TX
Clark, 
Herman
Herman Clark v. 
Collins
19 F. 3d 959 
(1994)
10/06/1994 TX
Coble, Billie Billie Coble v. 
Davis
682 Fed. Appx 
261 (2017)
N/A TX
Cockrell, 
Timothy
Timothy Cockrell 
v. Dretke
88 Fed. Appx 
34 (5th Cir. 
2004)
N/A TX
Cockrum, 
John
John Cockrum v. 
Johnson
119 F. 3d 297 
(5th Cir. 1997)
09/30/1997 TX
Coleman, 
Lisa
Lisa Coleman v. 
Thaler
716 F. 3d 895 
(5th Cir. 2013)
09/17/2014 TX
Conner, 
Ronnie
Ronnie Conner v. 
Epps
2002 U.S. App 
LEXIS 29673 
N/A MS
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(5th Cir. 2002)
Crane, Alvin Alvin Crane v. 
Johnson
178 F. 3d 309 
(5th Cir. 1999)
10/12/1999 TX
Crawford, 
Charles
Charles Crawford 
v. Epps
353 Fed. Appx. 
977 (5th Cir. 
2009)
N/A MS
Crutsinger, 
Billy
Billy Crutsinger v. 
Stephens
576 Fed. App. 
422 (5th Cir. 
2014)
N/A TX
Devoe, Paul Paul Devoe v. 
Davis
2018 U.S. App 
LEXIS 514 
(5th Cir. 2018)
N/A TX
Dowthitt, 
Dennis
Dennis Dowthitt 
v. Johnson
230 F. 3d 733 
(5th Cir. 2000)
03/07/2001 TX
Drew, Robert Robert Drew v. 
Collins
964 F. 2d 411 
(5th Cir. 1992)
08/02/1994 TX
Druery, 
Marcus
Marcus Druery v. 
Thaler
647 F. 3d 535 
(5th Cir. 2011)
N/A TX
Enriguez, 
Juan
Juan Enrigues v. 
Procunier 
752 F. 2d 111 
(5th Cir. 1984)
N/A TX
Escamilla, 
Licho
Licho Escamilla 
v. Stephens
602 Fed. Appx. 
939 (5th Cir. 
2015)
10/14/2015 TX
Esparza, 
Guadalupe
Guadalupe 
Esparza v. Thaler
408 Fed. Appx. 
787 (5th Cir. 
2010)
11/16/2011 TX
Evans, 
Connie
Connie Evans v. 
Cabana
821 F. 2d 1065 
(5th Cir. 1987)
10/08/1987 MS
Faulderv, 
Joseph
Joseph Faulderv 
v. Johnson
81 F. 3d 515 
(5th Cir. 1996)
N/A TX
Felde, Wayne Wayne Felde v. 
Butler 
817 F. 2d 281 
(5th Cir. 1987)
03/15/1988 LA
Feldman, 
Douglas
Douglas Feldman 
v. Thaler
695 F. 3d 372 
(5th Cir. 2012)
07/31/2013 TX
Flores, 
Andrew
Andrew Flores v. 
Dretke
82 Fed. Appx. 
92 (5th Cir. 
2003)
10/21/2004 TX
Flores, 
Charles
Charles Flores v. 
Stephens
794 F. 3d 494 
(5th Cir. 2015)
N/A TX
Foster, Ron Ron Foster v. 
Johnson 
293 F. 3d 766 
(5th Cir. 2002)
N/A TX
Freeman, 
James
James Freeman v. 
Stephens
614 Fed. Appx. 
180 (5th Cir. 
2015)
01/27/2016 TX
Gallamore, 
Samuel
Samuel 
Gallamore v. 
Cockrell
2001 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 31510 
(5th Cir. 2001)
01/14/2003 TX
Garza, 
Manuel
Manuel Garza v. 
Stephens
738 F. 3d 669 
(5th Cir. 2013)
04/15/2015 TX
Garza, 
Robert
Robert Garza v. 
Thaler
487 Fed. Appx. 
907 (5th Cir. 
2012)
09/09/2013 TX
Gates, Bill Bill Gates v. Davis 660 Fed. Appx. 
270 (5th Cir. 
N/A TX
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2016)
Gentry, 
Kenneth
Kenneth Gentry 
v. Johnson
1996 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 43513 
(5th Cir. 1996)
04/16/1997 TX
Gonzales, 
Ramiro 
Ramiro Gonzales 
v. Stephens
606 Fed. Appx. 
767 (5th Cir. 
2015)
N/A TX
Green, 
Dominique
Dominique 
Green v. Dretke
82 Fed. Appx.
333 (5th Cir. 
2003)
10/26/2004 TX
Green, 
Edward
Edward Green v. 
Cockrell
2003 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 28425 
(5th Cir. 2003)
10/05/2004 TX
Green, Ricky Ricky Green v. 
Johnson
116 F. 3d 1115 
(5th Cir. 1997)
10/08/1997 TX
Gray, 
Rodney
Rodney Gray v. 
Epps
616 F. 3d 436 
(5th Cir. 2010)
05/17/2011 MS
Guevara, 
Gilmar
Gilmar Guevara 
v. Stephens
577 Fed. Appx. 
364 (5th Cir. 
2014)
N/A TX
Hammond, 
Karl
Karl Hammond 
v. Scott
1994 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 43045 
(1994)
06/21/1995 TX
Hankins, 
Terry
Terry Hankins v. 
Quarterman
288 Fed. Appx. 
952 (5th Cir. 
2008)
06/02/2009 TX
Harris, David David Harris v. 
Cockrell
313 F. 3d 238 
(5th Cir. 2002)
06/30/2004 TX
Hernandez, 
Rogelio
Rogelio 
Hernandez v. 
Johnson
1997 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 12686 
(5th Cir. 1997)
N/A TX
Hoffman, 
Jessie
Jessie Hoffman v. 
Cain
752 F. 3d 430 
(5th Cir. 2014)
N/A TX
Hood, 
Charles
Charles Hood v. 
Dretke
93 Fed. Appx. 
665 (5th Cir. 
2004)
N/A TX
Hudson, 
Robert
Robert Hudson v. 
Quarterman
273 Fed. Appx. 
331 (5th Cir. 
2008)
11/20/2008 TX
Jackson, 
Henry
Henry Jackson v. 
Epps
447 Fed. Appx. 
535 (5th Cir. 
2011)
06/05/2012 MS
Jennings, 
Robert 
Robert Jennings 
v. Stephens
537 Fed. 
Appx. 326 (5th 
Cir. 2013)
01/30/2019 TX
Johnson, 
Edward
Edward Johnson 
v. Cabana 
818 F. 2d 333 
(5th Cir. 1987)
05/20/1987 MS
Johnson, 
Michael
Michael Johnson 
v. Cockrell
306 F. 3d 249 
(5th Cir. 2002)
N/A TX
Jones, Anzel Anzel Jones v. 
Cockrell 
74 Fed. Appx. 
317 (5th Cir. 
2003)
N/A TX
Jordan, 
Richard
Richard Jordan v. 
Epps
756 F. 3d 395 
(5th Cir. 2014)
N/A MS
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King, John John King v. 
Davis 
703 Fed. Appx. 
320 (5th Cir. 
2017)
N/A TX
King, Mack Mack King v. 
Puckett
1 F. 3d 280 
(5th Cir. 1993)
N/A MS
Kitchens, 
William
William Kitchens 
v. Johnson
190 F. 3d 698 
(5th Cir. 1999)
05/09/2000 TX
Knight, 
Patrick
Patrick Knight v. 
Quarterman
186 Fed. Appx.
518 (5th Cir. 
2006)
06/26/2007 TX
Kunkle, Troy Troy Kunkle v. 
Dretke
352 F. 3d 980 
(5th Cir. 2003)
01/25/2005 TX
Kyles, Curtis Curtis Kyles v. 
Whitley 
5 F. 3d 806 
(5th Cir. 1993)
N/A TX
Ladd, Robert Robert Ladd v. 
Cockrell
311 F. 3d 349 
(5th Cir. 2002)
01/29/2015 TX
LaGrone, 
Edward
Edward LaGrone 
v. Cockrell
2003 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 18150 
(5th Cir. 2003)
02/11/2004 TX
Lincecum, 
Kavin
Kavin Lincecum 
v. Collins
958 F. 2d 1271 
(5th Cir. 1992)
12/10/1992 TX
Little, 
William
William Little v. 
Johnson 
162 F. 3d 855 
(5th Cir. 1998)
06/01/1999 TX
Lowenfield, 
Leslie
Leslie Lowenfield 
v. Phelps
817 F. 2d 285 
(5th Cir. 1987)
04/13/1988 LA
Mann, 
Fletcher
Fletcher Mann v. 
Scott
41 F. 3d 968 
(5th Cir. 1994)
06/01/1995 TX
Martinez, 
David
David Martinez v. 
Quarterman
270 Fed. Appx. 
277 (5th Cir. 
2008)
02/04/2009 TX
Martinez, 
Raymond
Raymond 
Martinez v. Davis
653 Fed. Appx. 
308 (5th Cir. 
2016)
N/A TX
Martinez, 
Virgil
Virgil Martinez v. 
Quarterman 
481 F. 3d 249 
(5th Cir. 2007)
01/28/2009 TX
Masterson, 
Richard
Richard
Masterson v. 
Stephens
596 Fed. Appx. 
282 (5th Cir. 
2015)
01/20/2016 TX
Mathis, 
Milton
Milton Mathis v. 
Dretke
124 Fed. Appx. 
865 (5th Cir. 
2005)
06/21/2011 TX
Mattheson, 
Howard
Howard 
Mattheson v. 
King
751 F. 2d 1432 
(5th Cir. 1985)
N/A LA
Mays, 
Randall
Randall Mays v. 
Stephens
757 F. 3d 211 
(5th Cir. 2014)
N/A TX
McBride, 
Michael
Michael McBride 
v. Johnson
1997 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 42198 
(5th Cir. 1997)
05/11/2000 TX
McCoy, 
Stephen
Stephen McCoy 
v. Lynaugh
874 F. 2d 954 
(5th Cir. 1989)
05/24/1989 TX
Miniel, Peter Peter Miniel v. 
Cockrell
339 F. 3d 331 
(5th Cir. 2003)
10/06/2004 TX
Mitchell, William Mitchell 641 F. 3d 134 03/22/2012 MS
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William v. Epps (5th Cir. 2011)
Moody, John John Moody v. 
Johnson 
139 F. 3d 477 
(5th Cir. 1998)
01/05/1999 TX
Moore, 
Bobby
Bobby Moore v. 
Johnson
194 F. 3d 586 
(5th Cir. 1999)
N/A TX
Mosley, 
Kenneth
Kenneth Mosley 
v. Quarterman
306 Fed. Appx. 
40 (5th Cir. 
2008)
01/07/2010 TX
Motley, 
Jeffrey
Jeffrey Motley v. 
Collins
18 F. 3d 1223 
(5th Cir. 1994)
02/07/1995 TX
Neal, 
Howard
Howard Neal v. 
Puckett
286 F. 3d 230 
(5th Cir. 2002)
N/A MS
Newbury, 
Donald
Donald Newbury 
v. Stephens
756 F. 3d 850 
(5th Cir. 2014)
02/04/2015 TX
Nixon, John John Nixon v. 
Epps
405 F. 3d 318 
(5th Cir. 2005)
12/14/2005 MS
Nobles, 
Jonathan
Jonathan Nobles 
v. Johnson
127 F. 3d 409 
(5th Cir. 1997)
10/07/1998 TX
Norman, 
LeJames
LeJames Norman 
v. Stephens
817 F. 3d 226 
(5th Cir. 2016)
N/A TX
Nuncio, Paul Paul Nuncio v. 
Johnson 
2000 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 41233 
(5th Cir. 2000)
06/15/2000 TX
O’Brien, 
Derrick
Derrick O’Brien 
v. Dretke
156 Fed. Appx. 
724 (5th Cir. 
2005)
N/A TX
Ogan, Craig Craig Ogan v. 
Cockrell
297 F. 3d 349 
(5th Cir. 2002)
11/19/2002 TX
Paredes, 
Miguel
In re Miguel 
Paredes
587 Fed. Appx. 
805 (5th Cir. 
2014)
10/28/2014 TX
Patterson, 
Kelsey
Kelsey Patterson 
v. Cockrell
2033 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 28033 
(5th Cir. 2003)
05/18/2004 TX
Perkins, 
Reginald
Reginald Perkins 
v. Quarterman
254 Fed. Appx. 
366 (5th Cir. 
2007)
01/22/2009 TX
Perry, 
Michael
Michael Perry v. 
Quarterman
314 Fed. Appx. 
663 (5th Cir. 
2009)
07/01/2010 TX
Prejean, 
Dalton
Dalton Prejean v. 
Smith
889 F. 2d 1391 
(5th Cir. 1989)
05/18/1990 LA
Raby, 
Charles
Charles Raby v. 
Dretke
78 Fed. Appx. 
324 (5th Cir. 
2003)
N/A TX
Rayford, 
William
William Rayford 
v. Stephens
622 Fed. Appx. 
315 (5th Cir. 
2015)
01/18/2018 TX
Rector, 
Charles
Charles Rector v. 
Johnson
120 F. 3d 551 
(5th Cir. 1997)
03/29/1999 TX
Riles, 
Raymond
Raymond Riles v. 
McCotter
799 F. 2d 947 
(5th Cir. 1986)
N/A TX
Riley, 
Michael
Michael Riley v. 
Dretke
362 F. 3d 302 
(5th Cir. 2004)
05/19/2005 TX
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Robertson, 
Brian
Brian Robertson 
v. Johnson 
2000 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 40417 
(5th Cir. 2000)
08/09/2000 TX
Roberts, 
Douglas
Douglas Roberts 
v. Dretke
381 F. 3d 491 
(5th Cir. 2004)
04/20/2005 TX
Robinson, 
Julius
Julius Robinson 
v. United States
2010 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 11675 
(5th Cir. 2010)
N/A TX
Robison, 
Larry
Larry Robison v. 
Johnson
151 F. 3d 256 
(5th Cir. 1998)
01/21/2000 TX
Rockwell, 
Kwame
Kwame Rockwell 
v. Davis
853 F. 3d 758 
(5th Cir. 2017)
N/A TX
Rodriguez, 
Rosendo 
Rosendo 
Rodriguez v. 
Davis
693 Fed. Appx. 
276 (5th Cir. 
2017)
03/27/2018 TX
Romero, 
Jesus 
Jesus Romero v. 
Lynaugh
884 F. 2d 871 
(5th Cir. 1989)
05/20/1992 TX
Santellan, 
Jose
Jose Santellan v. 
Cockrell
271 F. 3d 190 
(5th Cir. 190)
04/10/2002 TX
Sattiewhite, 
Vernon
Vernon
Sattiewhite v. 
Scott
1995 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 41815 
(5th Cir. 1995)
08/15/1995 TX
Sawyer, 
Robert 
Robert Sawyer v. 
Butler
848 F. 2d 582 
(5th Cir. 1988)
03/05/1993 LA
Segundo, 
Juan
Juan Segundo v. 
Davis 
831 F. 3d 345 
(5th Cir. 2016)
N/A TX
Sells, Tommy Tommy Sells v. 
Stephens
536 Fed. Appx. 
483 (5th Cir. 
2013)
04/03/2014 TX
Selvage, John John Selvage v. 
Lynaugh
842 F. 2d 89 
(5th Cir. 1988)
N/A TX
Sepulvado, 
Christopher
Christopher 
Sepulvado v. Cain
2003 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 28732 
(5th Cir. 2003)
N/A TX
Shore,
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APPENDIX B
In the Appendix, we share what we have been able to learn 
(from Westlaw, Internet searches and correspondence with 
most of the defendants’ appellate lawyers) happened after the 
decision in the Fifth Circuit case that relied on Strickland to 
order remands, to vacate convictions, or to issue Certificates 
of Appealability.
Kevin Zimmerman:
In Zimmerman v. Cockrell,334 the Fifth Circuit granted a 
COA.335 Subsequently, that court affirmed the decision below 
(finding his Strickland claims did not merit relief),336 and
Zimmerman’s certiorari petition was denied.337 Zimmerman
was executed in 2004.338
Alvin Scott Loyd:
In Loyd v. Whitley,339 the Fifth Circuit reversed and remand-
ed Loyd’s conviction and sentence, finding that trial coun-
sel’s failure to pursue independent psychological analysis of 
defendant was not professionally reasonable.340 After the Su-
preme Court denied the state’s petition for certiorari,341 Loyd 
334. Zimmerman v. Cockrell, No. 01-40591, 2002 WL 32833097 (5th Cir. 2002).
335. In earlier proceedings, the Supreme Court had remanded this case to the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals in light of its decision in Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993), 
on the question of the extent to which jury instructions on the question of future danger-
ousness took into account the defendant’s youth. See Zimmerman v. Texas, 510 U.S. 938 
(1993).
336. See Zimmerman v. Cockrell, 69 F. App’x 658, 2003 WL 21356018, *12 (5th Cir.
2003).
337. Zimmerman v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 1076 (2003).
338. See Kevin Zimmerman, THE MARSHALL PROJECT, https://www.themarshall
project.org/next-to-die/tx/0k47ocsq (last visited Jan. 8, 2020).
339. Loyd v. Whitley, 977 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1992).
340. One of Loyd’s trial counsel—Gordon Hackman—was subsequently suspended from 
the practice of law in Louisiana for two and a half years. See In re Gordon L. Hackman, 02-B-
1692 (La. 12/4/02); 833 So. 2d 916.
341. Whitley v. Loyd, 508 U.S. 911 (1993). In a subsequent matter related to the case 
(not related to the substance of this Article), the Fifth Circuit ruled on a question of attor-
neys’ fees under the Criminal Justice Act and the Federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A; 21 U.S.C. § 848; Loyd v. Whitley, 20 F.3d 1171 (5th Cir. 1994).
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was later retried;342 the jury returned a unanimous verdict for 
life imprisonment.343
Bobby James Moore:
In Moore v. Johnson,344 the Fifth Circuit found that trial 
counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of 
the punishment phase, and it remanded for further proceed-
ings. The death penalty was reinstated in state court.345
In subsequent proceedings, the Supreme Court vacated 
Moore’s conviction,346 on the grounds that the factors the 
Texas court had relied upon in evaluating claims brought 
under Atkins v. Virginia347 were based on superseded medical 
standards that create an unacceptable risk that a person with 
intellectual disabilities will be executed in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment On remand, relief was denied348; subse-
quently, the Supreme Court again granted certiorari and once 
more vacated Moore’s conviction.349
Walter J. Koon:
In Koon v. Cain,350 the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court
decision that defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective.351 After
the Supreme Court denied the state’s petition for certiorari,352
Koon was subsequently sentenced to life without parole.353
342. See State v. Loyd, 966-KK-1805 (La. 2/13/97); 689 So. 2d 1321.
343. Email from John Getsinger, Esq., Counsel to Alvin Loyd, to authors (Jan. 20, 2019) 
(on file with author).
344. Moore v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 586 (5th Cir. 1999).
345. See Moore v. State, No. 74-059, 2004 WL 231323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), cert. denied,
543 U.S. 931 (2004).
346. Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017).
347. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
348. Ex Parte Moore, 548 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
349. Moore v. Texas, 139 S. Ct. 666 (2019); see supra text accompanying note 271. The 
Teas Court of Criminal Appeals subsequently resentenced Moore to a term of life impris-
onment. See Ex parte Moore, 587 S.W. 3d 787 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2019).).
350. Koon v. Cain, 277 F. App’x 381, 2008 WL 1924217 (5th Cir. 2008).
351. See John Floyd & Billy Sinclair, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases, JOHN T.
FLOYD L. FIRM (Dec. 5, 2008), https://www.johntfloyd.com/ineffective-assistance-of-counsel-
in-capital-cases/ (discussing in depth the ineffective work done by Koon’s trial counsel).
352. Cain v. Koon, 555 U.S. 1010 (2008).
353. E.g., John Pope, Sam Dalton, Sex-Decade Lawyer Who Fought Death Penalty, Defended Poor 
People, Dies at 90, NOLA.COM (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.nola.com/news/crime_
police/article_e2480b59-86be-5cba-b9ff-a3697f902ef2.html.
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Anthony Leroy Pierce:
In Pierce v. Thaler,354 the Fifth Circuit ruled that the defend-
ant was entitled to a COA on his ineffectiveness of counsel
claim.355 Subsequently, however, the same court ruled that the
defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing in the 
federal district court on his claim under Atkins, that his intel-
lectual disability estopped the state from executing him.356
Subsequently, after thirty-five years, the defendant was tak-
en off death row and was resentenced to life without parole.357
Gaylon Walbey Jr.:
In Walbey v. Quarterman,358 the Fifth Circuit held that the 
defendant had been denied effective assistance as a result of 
trial counsel’s deficient investigation of a potential mitigation 
defense. Although the chief county District Attorney an-
nounced at this time that he was going to seek the death 
penalty again in a new trial, his successor in office chose to 
accept, instead, a plea to a life sentence.359
Carlos Trevino:
In Trevino v. Davis,360 the Fifth Circuit granted a COA on 
the issue of ineffectiveness of counsel.361 In subsequent pro-
ceedings, however, the Circuit ruled (with one dissent) that 
trial counsel’s alleged failure to adequately investigate and 
354. Pierce v. Thaler, 355 F. App’x 784, 2009 WL 4572839 (5th Cir. 2009).
355. Pierce’s trial lawyer was subsequently suspended. See In re Ronald G. Mock, BD.
DISCIPLINARY APP., TEX. (Dec. 8, 2004), http://txboda.org/cases/re-ronald-g-mock.
356. Pierce v. Thaler, 604 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 2010).
357. E.g., Allan Turner, DA’s Office Plans to Not Seek Execution of Man on Death Row Since 
1978, CHRON (Aug. 30, 2012, 3:00 AM), https://www.chron.com/news/houston-
texas/article/DA-s-office-plans-to-not-seek-execution-of-man-on-3825169.php. See also email 
from David Dow Esq., Pierce’s appellate counsel, to authors of this Article (Jan. 20, 2019).
358. Walbey v. Quarterman, 309 F. App’x 795, 2009 WL 113778 (5th Cir. 2009).
359. See Leigh Jones, supra note 191; see also Harvey Rice, Death Row Inmate Gets a Chance 
to Avoid Execution, CHRON (Jan. 19, 2009), https://www.chron.com/neighborhood/baytown-
news/article/Death-row-inmate-gets-a-chance-to-avoid-execution-1537243.php (providing 
further information about the Fifth Circuit’s decision).
360. Trevino v. Davis, 829 F.3d 328 (5th Cir. 2016).
361. Id. at 356. This decision followed a 5-4 remand from the U.S. Supreme Court ruling 
that further proceedings were required to determine whether petitioner’s attorney in his 
first state collateral proceeding was ineffective, and whether the ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel claim was substantial. See Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (2013).
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present certain mitigating evidence at sentencing did not 
prejudice petitioner, and thus was not ineffective assistance.362
Victor Hugo Saldaño:
In Saldaño v. Davis,363 the Fifth Circuit ruled that there was
a question as to whether trial counsel behaved deficiently in 
failing to request a competency hearing, granting in part the 
defendant’s application for a COA.364 In subsequent proceed-
ings, however, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
denial of habeas corpus relief, finding that the defendant 
“has failed to offer clear and convincing evidence to rebut 
the state habeas court’s factual determination that there was 
insufficient evidence to raise a bona fide doubt as to compe-
tency.”365
Andre Lewis:
In Lewis v. Johnson,366 the Fifth Circuit remanded the case to 
the district court for a full evidentiary hearing on the de-
fendant’s claims of inadequacy of counsel. Subsequently, in 
Lewis v. Cockrell,367 the district court found that, “even if the 
‘cause’ prong were satisfied, Petitioner has failed to prove 
362. See Trevino v. Davis, 861 F. 3d 545, 550–51 (5th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct.
1793 (2018). For Trevino’s thoughts, see Carlos Trevino #999235, DEATHROW-USA,
http://deathrow-usa.com/carlos_trevino.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2019).
363. Saldaño v. Davis, 701 Fed. App’x 302 (5th Cir. 2017).
364. Id. at 316. Earlier, the Supreme Court had remanded this case “for further consid-
eration in light of the confession of error by the Solicitor General of Texas.” Saldaño v. Tex-
as, 530 U.S. 1212, 1212 (2000). Apparently, that “confession of error” dealt with the ques-
tion of “[w]hether a defendant’s race or ethnic background may ever be used as an 
aggravating circumstance in the punishment phase of a capital murder trial in which the 
State seeks the death penalty.” Saldaño v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 875 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). 
The court concluded that “the State’s confession of error in the Supreme Court is contrary 
to our state’s procedural law for presenting a claim on appeal, as well as the Supreme 
Court’s enforcement of such procedural law when it is presented with equal-protection 
claims.” Id. at 891.
365. Saldaño v. Davis, 759 F. App’x 276, 279 (5th Cir 2019), cert. denied 2019 WL 6107808
(2019). Saldaño is the only Argentinian citizen on death row. See Gerald O’Connell, Today 
Pope Francis Met with the Mother of the Only Argentinian on Death Row in the United States, AM.
MAG. (June 11, 2016), https://www.americamagazine.org/content/dispatches/pope-francis-
meets-mother-only-argentinian-death-row-united-states; Jordan S. Rubin, Argentina Backs Texas 
Death Row Prisoner at U.S. Supreme Court, BLOOMBERG LAW (Oct. 23, 2019). On his mother’s conversa-
tions with the Pope about this case, see Associated Press, Argentinian Mom Hopes Pope Can Help 
Get Son Out of Texas Death Row, NBC NEWS (Aug. 27, 2015, 10:34 AM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/argentinian-mom-hopes-pope-can-help-get-son-out-
texas-n416821.
366. Lewis v. Johnson, No. 96-10616, 2000 WL 35549205 (5th Cir. 2000).
367. Lewis v. Cockrell, No. 3-93-329-G, 2002 WL 1398554 (N.D. Tex. 2002).
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‘prejudice’ as set out in Strickland.”368 This decision was then
reversed by the Fifth Circuit, finding that counsel’s perfor-
mance in failing to adduce evidence of petitioner’s abusive 
childhood at penalty phase was deficient, thus causing preju-
dice.369
According to a press account, Lewis was subsequently re-
moved from death row and was, at the time of the article, 
serving a life sentence in a different Texas state prison.370 with
the possibility of parole.371
David Earl Wilson:
In Wilson v. Butler,372 the Fifth Circuit ruled that trial coun-
sel had performed deficiently regarding the investigation in-
to Wilson’s mental health and the subsequent presentation of 
this evidence at the penalty phase. His entitlement to a re-
hearing was affirmed by the Circuit in a subsequent opin-
ion.373 Subsequently, Wilson was finally granted a new trial 
and, in a plea bargain with the state, pled guilty to life in 
prison rather than going to trial once more.374
Carl Lockett:
In Lockett v. Anderson,375 the Fifth Circuit ruled that trial 
counsel was ineffective in failing to conduct adequate investi-
gation into available mitigating evidence. After remand, the 
defendant was sentenced to life without parole.376
368. Id. at *12.
369. See Lewis v. Dretke, 355 F.3d 364, 369–70 (5th Cir. 2003).
370. See Robert Wilonsky, Life After Death, DALL. OBSERVER (Dec. 16, 2004),
https://www.dallasobserver.com/news/life-after-death-6382994.
371. See email from Richard Ellis, Esq., Lewis’s appellate counsel, to authors (Jan. 21, 
2019) (on file with authors).
372. Wilson v. Butler, 813 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1987).
373. See Wilson v. Butler 825 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1079 (1988).
374. See email from William Quigley, Esq., Wilson’s appellate counsel, to authors (Jan. 
19, 2019) (on file with authors). For more on Wilson and the litigation, see Wilson v. Zim-
merman, No. 08-3507, 2008 WL 2699740 (E.D. La. 2008).
375. Lockett v. Anderson, 230 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 2000).
376. See email from Jeffrey Friesen, Esq., Lockett’s appellate counsel, to authors (Jan. 19, 
2019) (on file with authors).
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Edward Lee Busby:
In Busby v. Davis,377 the Fifth Circuit granted a COA on the 
questions of whether the defendant received ineffective assis-
tance of direct appeal counsel, and whether trial counsel was 
ineffective by failing to conduct an adequate sentencing in-
vestigation or to present an adequate mitigation case during 
the penalty phase of trial. On rehearing, the Fifth Circuit 
held that Busby did not establish ineffectiveness by counsel, 
and again affirmed the conviction.378 According to Busby’s
appellate counsel, defendant’s petition for rehearing en banc
is pending.379
Larry Jones
In Jones v. Thigpen,380 the Fifth Circuit affirmed its earlier 
decision that Jones had been denied ineffective assistance of 
counsel on the ground of ineffectiveness of counsel at the 
sentencing phase of the case, where counsel failed to present 
proof at sentencing phase of age and mental disability of de-
fendant, who was mentally disabled, seventeen years old at 
time of crime, and there had been no proof that he had had 
any intent or role in homicide.381 After the Supreme Court’s
denials of certiorari,382 there is no more information to be 
found about the case.383
377. Busby v. Davis, 677 F. App’x 884 (5th Cir. 2017).
378. Busby v. Davis, 892 F.3d 735, 762 (5th Cir. 2018).
379. See email from David Dow, Esq., Busby’s current appellate counsel, to authors (Jan. 
20, 2019) (on file with authors).
380. Jones v. Thigpen, 788 F. 2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1986).
381. Id. at 1103. The Fifth Circuit’s earlier decision, Jones v. Thigpen, 741 F.2d 805 (5th 
Cir. 1984), had been vacated by the Supreme Court in Thigpen v. Jones, 475 U.S. 1003 
(1986), in light of that Court’s intervening decision in Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 
(1986), on the question of death-eligibility in cases involving whether the defendant had 
intended to commit homicide.
382. See Thigpen v. Jones, 479 U.S. 1087 (1987).
383. Emails to counsel went unanswered.
